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This Security Sector Reform (SSR) Paper offers a universal and analytical perspective 
on the linkages between Security Sector Governance (SSG)/SSR (SSG/R) and Sus-
tainable Development Goal-16 (SDG-16), focusing on conflict and post-conflict set-
tings as well as transitional and consolidated democracies. Against the background 
of development and security literatures traditionally maintaining separate and com-
partmentalized presence in both academic and policymaking circles, it maintains 
that the contemporary security- and development-related challenges are inextri-
cably linked, requiring effective measures with an accurate understanding of the 
nature of these challenges. In that sense, SDG-16 is surely a good step in the right 
direction. After comparing and contrasting SSG/R and SDG-16, this SSR Paper ar-
gues that human security lies at the heart of the nexus between the 2030 Agenda of 
the United Nations (UN) and SSG/R. To do so, it first provides a brief overview of 
the scholarly and policymaking literature on the development-security nexus to set 
the background for the adoption of The Agenda 2030. Next, it reviews the literature 
on SSG/R and SDGs, and how each concept evolved over time. It then identifies the 
puzzle this study seeks to address by comparing and contrasting SSG/R with SDG-
16. After making a case that human security lies at the heart of the nexus between 
the UN’s 2030 Agenda and SSG/R, this book then analyses the strengths and weak-
nesses of human security as a bridge between SSG/R and SDG-16 and makes policy 
recommendations on how SSG/R, bolstered by human security, may help achieve 
better results on the SDG-16 targets. It specifically emphasizes the importance of 
transparency, oversight, and accountability on the one hand, and participative ap-
proach and local ownership on the other. It concludes by arguing that a simultane-
ous emphasis on security and development is sorely needed for addressing the issues 
under the purview of SDG-16.. 
SSR Papers provide innovative and provocative analysis on the challenges of 
security sector governance and reform. Combining theoretical insight with detailed 
empirically-driven explorations of state-of-the-art themes, SSR Papers bridge 
conceptual and pragmatic concerns. The series is authored, edited, and peer reviewed 
by SSR experts, and run in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Through in-depth discussions of governance-
driven reform SSR Papers address the overlapping interests of researchers, policy-
makers and practitioners in the fields of development, peace, and security.
SSR Paper 20
The Nexus Between Security 
Sector Governance/Reform 
and Sustainable  
Development Goal-16: 
An Examination of Conceptual 
Linkages and Policy 
Recommendations















Text © Oya Dursun-Özkanca 2021
First published 2021
Cover photograph: Aubrey Wade, Panos Pictures
Cover photograph description: Winnefred, a Liberian National Police (LNP) officer, tells Itee, a female 
peacekeeping soldier belonging to the all-female unit of Indian UN peacekeepers in Monrovia, about the 
ingredients used in local dishes while out on a Joint Task Force (JTF) patrol in the Duport Road area.






ISSN (Print): 2571-9289 
ISSN (Online): 2571-9297
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/bcm
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0  International 
License (unless stated otherwise within the content of the work). To view a copy of this license, visit 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 444 Castro Street, 
Suite 900, Mountain View, California, 94041, USA. This license allows sharing and copying any part of the 
work for personal use, providing author attribution is clearly stated. This license prohibits commercial use 
of the material.
The full text of this book has been peer-reviewed to ensure high academic standards. For full review poli-
cies, see https://www.ubiquitypress.com/
Suggested citation: 
Dursun-Özkanca, O. 2021. The Nexus Between Security Sector Governance/Reform and Sustainable  
Development Goal-16: An Examination of Conceptual Linkages and Policy Recommendations. London: 
Ubiquity Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/bcm. License: CC-BY-NC
Correction (23 June 2021):  
Page 59, paragraph 2 of the originally published manuscript has been updated. The concept of “trilemma” 
was incorrectly attributed to Gill (2020). In the updated version of the manuscript, the concept of “trilemma” 
was correctly attributed to Cayford, Pieters & Hijzen (2018). A missing reference to Gill (2020) was also 
added to the References list.
To read the free, open access version of this book 
online, visit https://doi.org/10.5334/bcm or scan this 
QR code with your mobile device:
Table of Contents
List of Tables v
Dedication vii
SSR Papers ix




Chapter 1. Introduction 1
a. A roadmap 3
b. The security-development nexus 3
c. United Nations’ approach to the security-development nexus 4
d. Other international organizations’ approaches to the security-development nexus 6
e. The security-development nexus debate in academia and policymaking 7
Chapter 2. Literature Review 11
a. The literature on SSG/R 11
i. SSG/R and development 13
ii. Critiques of the SSR-development nexus 15
b. The literature on sustainable development, Agenda 2030, and SDG-16 16
i. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 16
ii. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 17
Chapter 3. SDG-16: Content and Controversies 21
a. SDG-16 content 21
b. SDG-16 controversies 22
Chapter 4. The Puzzle 27
Chapter 5. Conceptual Framework: SSG/R and SDG-16 Nexus 31
a. Commonalities between SSG/R and SDG-16 31
i. Inclusivity 32
ii. Context specificity 34
iii. Governance and institutionalization 34
1. Transparency, democratic oversight, accountability, and legitimacy 34
2. The rule of law 35
b. Differences between SSG/R and SDG-16 35
Chapter 6. How to Better Tie SSG/R and SDG-16 Together 39
a. Human security: An introduction 39
b. Human security as a linkage between SSG/R and SDG-16 41
Chapter 7. Analysis 47
a. Strengths of human security as a bridge 47
b. Weaknesses of human security as a bridge 50
i. Narrow and broad definitions of human security 50
ii. Actionability of the human security concept 52
iii. Human security and national sovereignty 52
c. Implications of COVID-19 for human security 52
Chapter 8. Next Steps: Policy Recommendations 55
a. How can SSG/R help with SDG-16 targets? 55
i. Oversight and accountability 56




 1. SDG-16 Targets 22
 2. SSG/R and SDG-16 Commonalities 32
 3. Human Security Components 41

Dedication
To my parents, Dr. Gönül Oya Dursun (1944–2017) and Dr. Yunus Dursun, for serving as great 
role models and believing in me.

SSR Papers
The DCAF SSR Papers provide original, innovative and provocative analysis on the challenges of 
security sector governance and reform. Combining theoretical insight with detailed empirically- 
driven explorations of state-of-the-art themes, SSR Papers bridge conceptual and pragmatic 
concerns. Authored, edited and peer reviewed by SSR experts, the series provides a unique 
platform for in-depth discussion of a governance-driven reform agenda, addressing the overlap-
ping interests of researchers, policy-makers and practitioners in the fields of development, peace 
and security.
DCAF, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, is dedicated to making states and 
people safer. Good security sector governance, based on the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, is the very basis of development and security. DCAF assists partner states in develop-
ing laws, institutions, policies and practices to improve the governance of their security sector 
through inclusive and participatory reforms based on international norms and good practices.

About the Author
Dr. Oya Dursun-Özkanca (University of Texas at Austin, Ph.D.) is Endowed Chair of Interna-
tional Studies and Professor of Political Science at Elizabethtown College. Her research interests 
include transatlantic security, European Union, South East Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 
and peace operations. She is the author of Turkey–West Relations: The Politics of Intra-alliance 
Opposition (Cambridge University Press, 2019). She is also the editor of The European Union as 
an Actor in Security Sector Reform (Routledge, 2014) and External Interventions in Civil Wars 
(co-edited with Stefan Wolff, Routledge, 2014). Her articles appeared in Foreign Policy Analysis, 
Civil Wars, European Security, and Ethnopolitics, among others.

Declaration
The views expressed in this publication do not in any way reflect the opinion or views of 
DCAF, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.
This book has been peer reviewed by multiple experts within the subject area. One of these 
peer reviewers is employed by DCAF but was not part of the editorial processes.

Acknowledgements
I am thankful for the love and support of my husband Kemal and my sons Bora and Tolan, 
which kept me strong and centered during the writing process of this manuscript throughout the 
COVID-19 lockdown. I would like to thank William McDermott, Alexandra Preperier, Merle 
Jasper, and the two anonymous peer reviewers for giving me such constructive and helpful feed-
back on my manuscript. I also would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Wayne Selcher 
for reading this manuscript in its entirety and helping me edit it. Parts of the penultimate chapter 
were published in Dursun-Özkanca, O 2018 The European Union rule of law mission in Kosovo: 
An analysis from the local perspective. Ethnopolitics, 17(1): 71–94.

Executive Summary
This Security Sector Reform (SSR) Paper offers a universal and analytical perspective on the 
linkages between Security Sector Governance (SSG)/SSR (SSG/R) and Sustainable Develop-
ment Goal-16 (SDG-16), focusing on conflict and post-conflict settings as well as transitional 
and consolidated democracies. Against the background of development and security literatures 
traditionally maintaining separate and compartmentalized presence in both academic and poli-
cymaking circles, it maintains that the contemporary security- and development-related chal-
lenges are inextricably linked, requiring effective measures with an accurate understanding of 
the nature of these challenges. In that sense, SDG-16 is surely a good step in the right direction. 
This manuscript attempts to bridge the gap between the development and security literatures by 
offering a conceptual framework for the interlinkages between SSG/R with SDG-16, tying the 
two together more closely using human security as a linkage. After comparing and contrasting 
SSG/R and SDG-16, this manuscript argues that human security lies at the heart of the nexus 
between the 2030 Agenda of the United Nations (UN) and SSG/R. It highlights the importance 
of the principles of democratic oversight and accountability as well as a participative approach 
and local ownership in making sure that SSR effectively contributes to the accomplishment of 
SDG-16 targets. 
Oya Dursun-Özkanca 
College Professor of International Studies, 
Endowed Chair 






Development and security literatures have traditionally maintained a separate and compart-
mentalized presence in both academic and policymaking circles. Nevertheless, contemporary 
security- and development-related challenges rarely occur in isolation and they are inextricably 
linked. Failed and failing states, ethno-nationalist and religious extremist ideologies, extreme 
poverty, corruption, organized crime, displacement, refugees, and environmental issues pose 
complex challenges to individuals, societies, as well as the international community – that is, 
international and regional organizations as well as their member states, requiring effective meas-
ures and an accurate understanding of the nature of these challenges. 
To illustrate, at the end of 2019, about 736 million people (10% of the world’s population) lived 
in extreme poverty, about 821 million were malnourished, and about 30% of young women and 
13% of young men were not enrolled in education (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] 
2019: 25). According to the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), 79.5 million people 
were forced to flee their homes due to ‘persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations or 
events seriously disturbing public order’ (2020: 2). The aggregate forcible displacement figure in 
the last 10 years is over 100 million people (UNHCR 2020). Climate change and food insecurity 
are expected to become major drivers of conflicts and displacement, as about 350 million peo-
ple are affected by climate change-related disasters, ‘reversing hard-won development gains and 
exacerbating poverty’ (UN Secretary-General [UNSG] 2019: 7; UNHCR 2020). ‘As these and 
other problems persist and proliferate, we see growing fear, uncertainty and frustration under-
mining public trust in institutions and political establishments,’ creating a ‘breeding ground for 
hate speech, xenophobia and other divisive and dangerous narratives’ (UNGA 2019: 7). 
Moreover, many countries around the world were already struggling to meet the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG-16, before COVID-19 (Sachs et al. 2019). 
Responses to COVID-19 have further illustrated the existing patterns of systemic social and 
economic inequalities, disparities in access to resources, discrimination, and intolerance, 
and demonstrated how interconnected the environment, economy, employment, and health 
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and well-being are. As noted in the UN’s Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity report published 
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (UN 2020c: 8), the developing world will particularly 
experience additional setbacks, as the pandemic ‘will further weaken an already fragile macro-
economic picture, where debt accumulation has outpaced the growth of income even before the 
crisis.’ The same report warns that ‘conflicts prevent effective measures for fighting COVID-19,’ 
and ‘those in conflict areas are most at risk of suffering devastating loss from COVID-19’ (UN 
2020c: 12). For instance, the pandemic has augmented the power of criminal networks in Brazil 
(Berg & Varsori 2020) and increased democratic backsliding and draconian measures in the 
Western Balkans (Wunsch 2020). It created a ‘shadow pandemic,’ by causing increased violence 
against women and girls (Azcona et al. 2020: 21). The pandemic is also expected to reverse ‘dec-
ades of progress in the fight against poverty,’ and exacerbate ‘already high levels of inequality 
within and between states’ (UN 2020c: 8). 
Due to the interconnected nature of security and development, such complex challenges require 
a multifaceted yet coordinated response from all stakeholders at the international, national, and 
local levels. Just like it is not possible to have peace and security without sustainable economic 
development, it is not feasible to have sustainable economic development without peace and secu-
rity. By including Goal 16, Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions among its SDGs as part of its 
Agenda 2030, the UN signaled that there is more to be done to link security and development 
around the world (UNGA 2015). The full title of SDG-16 – ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive socie-
ties for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable 
and inclusive institutions at all levels’ (UNGA 2015: 14) – aptly signifies the importance of the 
linkages among peace, security, justice, accountability, inclusivity, and sustainable development. 
As noted in Agenda 2030, ‘the interlinkages and integrated nature of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals are of crucial importance in ensuring that the purpose of the new Agenda is realized’ 
(UNGA 2015: 2). 
There are significant links between SSG/R and SDG-16. While SDG-16 contains numerous 
targets related to SSG/R, its targets are not solely about the security sector and includes signifi-
cant references to sustainable development. SSR is increasingly employed as an approach to post-
conflict reconstruction and democratic transitions. While the SSR literature mainly focuses on 
post-conflict contexts (Dursun-Özkanca 2017), SSG has a broader application around the world 
and is pertinent to all countries. As the developments in the United States (US) following the mur-
ders of Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, Rayshard Brooks, and Daniel Prude under police custody 
revealed, not even the most advanced democracies in the world are exempt from structural defi-
ciencies and systemic racism in the security sector. The rapid spread of international protests espe-
cially in response to the Floyd murder has underlined the urgent need for universally addressing 
institutionalized manifestations of racism and discrimination. Furthermore, the overwhelmingly 
disproportionate use of force against peaceful protestors revealed that even the most advanced 
democracies around the world would benefit from SSR and respecting good governance princi-
ples, such as accountability, which are advocated by SSG. To illustrate, in July and August 2020, the 
Trump Administration deployed US federal forces without name tags, even initially without iden-
tifying insignia, to a number of cities, such as Chicago, Portland, and Albuquerque in response 
to the peaceful protests. This raised significant concerns about transparency and accountability 
(Connecticut Law Tribune, 6 August 2020), as well as the application of ‘human rights principles 
of necessity, proportionality, legality, and accountability for the use of crowd-control weapons’ 
(Heisler, Mishori & Haar 2020). Furthermore, the US Government Accountability Office recently 
agreed to review matters related to the US federal government’s use of ‘less-lethal weapons and 
tactics,’ such as the consideration of the use of a heat ray on peaceful protesters (Temple-Raston 
2020). This renewed the public debate on the disproportionate of the use of force by the police.
Therefore, a universal and comprehensive analysis of the linkages between SSG/R and Sustaina-
ble Development Goal-16 (SDG-16) is called for. For this purpose, the current manuscript expands 
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the focus on the study of the SSG/R-SDG-16 nexus to include a variety of contexts – conflict 
and post-conflict settings as well as transitional and consolidated democracies. This manuscript 
attempts to bridge the gap between the development and security literatures by exploring the con-
ceptual and analytical linkages between SSG/R and SDG-16 to determine how SSG/R and SDG-16 
are interlinked. 
a. A roadmap
This manuscript offers a conceptual framework for the linkages between SSG/R and SDG-16, 
proposes new ways of looking at this relationship, and seeks to tie the two more closely by using 
human security as a bond. To do so, it first provides a brief overview of the scholarly and poli-
cymaking literature on the development-security nexus to set the background for the adoption 
of The Agenda 2030. Next, it reviews the literature on SSG/R and SDGs, and how each concept 
evolved over time. It then identifies the puzzle this study seeks to address by comparing and con-
trasting SSG/R with SDG-16. After making a case that human security lies at the heart of the 
nexus between the UN’s 2030 Agenda and SSG/R, this manuscript then analyses the strengths 
and weaknesses of human security as a bridge between SSG/R and SDG-16 and makes policy 
recommendations on how SSG/R, bolstered by human security, may help achieve better results 
on the SDG-16 targets. It specifically emphasizes the importance of transparency, oversight, and 
accountability on the one hand, and participative approach and local ownership on the other. It 
concludes by arguing that a simultaneous emphasis on security and development is sorely needed 
for addressing the issues under the purview of SDG-16. 
b. The security-development nexus
The security-development nexus is not necessarily something new. The founders of the Bretton 
Woods system recognized it back in the 1940s (Zoellick 2008). In fact, in founding the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which later has become the World 
Bank (WB) Group, they noted, ‘Programs of reconstruction and development will speed eco-
nomic progress everywhere, will aid political stability and foster peace’ (The US Department of 
State Bulletin 1944: 114). Drawing on the same recognition, Rostow (1971) proposed a universal-
ist model that perceives all nations rationally pursuing the goals of industrialization and material 
security, thereby lessening the causes of social conflict and promoting political stability. Rostow’s 
‘optimistic philosophy is captured in US President John F. Kennedy’s motto “a rising tide lifts 
all boats,” which saw economic strategies overcoming racial and social inequalities domestically 
and development inequalities internationally’ (Pupavac 2010: 696). Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that Rostow’s theory has been criticized for its Westernized and neo-colonialist features 
(Jacobs 2015). 
Development and security are essential for economic, social, and political stability. There is an 
important relationship between poverty, corruption, mismanagement of resources, and justice 
(UK Department for International Development [UK DFID] 2009). Having a well-functioning 
rule of law is necessary for sustaining peace and security. There are ‘negative consequences of 
insecurity on poverty reduction efforts’ (Bergenas & Mahoney 2016). Therefore, solely devoting 
attention to national economic development without security concerns might exacerbate insecu-
rities that are already existent (Boyce 2002; Maresko 2004; Uvin 1998). While insecurity destroys 
the economic and political structure of a country, it also damages the access to justice. 
The difference between negative and positive peace emerges as important to address at this con-
juncture. In one of the earliest studies on the security-development nexus, Galtung (1964) defines 
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negative peace as ‘the absence of violence, absence of war,’ and positive peace as ‘the integration of 
human society.’ The latter proves to serve as an important connection between the development 
and security spheres, as it contains ‘the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain 
peaceful societies’ (Institute for Economics & Peace [IEP] 2020: 54). There are eight pillars of posi-
tive peace: ‘well-functioning government, sound business environment, accepting the rights of 
others, good relations with neighbors, free flow of information, high levels of human capital, low 
levels of corruption, and equitable distribution of resources,’ which make the connection between 
development and security clear (IEP 2020: 55).
Since the 1990s, there has been an increasing number of scholars and international organiza-
tions that recognize the interconnectedness among development and peace and security. Many 
scholars argued that the provision of security is a precondition for development and well-being 
(Krause & Jütersonke 2005; Schwarz 2005). Nevertheless, in the last decade or so, the interna-
tional community has gradually started to view security and development as mutually reinforcing 
areas and acknowledged the need to achieve development and security concurrently, rather than 
addressing one as a precondition for addressing the other. A quick overview of the major policy 
papers and reports adopted by the leading international organizations over time effectively illus-
trates this observation. International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the WB, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the European Union 
(EU), all published key documents that led the way for the international community to acknowl-
edge the interconnected nature of security/peace and development. 
c. United Nations’ approach to the security-development nexus
In 1992, in his An Agenda for Peace report, then UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros-Ghali 
(UNSG 1992) encouraged the international security architectures to respond to the challenges 
of post-conflict reconstruction in the aftermath of the Cold War. This generated the multidi-
mensional or integrated peacebuilding missions, such as the ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, 
Timor-Leste, and Sierra Leone. The multidimensional or integrated peacebuilding missions are 
complex missions that aim at restoring the political, economic, and social infrastructures in post-
conflict societies to establish governance and the rule of law, as well as social justice and economic 
development (Benner & Rotmann 2008; Dursun-Özkanca 2016). For example, a number of EU 
missions, such as the ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Georgia, are aimed at 
SSR (especially capacity-building in relation to police forces and border guards) and others, such 
as the ones in Kosovo and Georgia, aim at the development of the rule of law. The UN mis-
sion to East Timor was perhaps the most ‘ambitious’ of these complex operations ‘as it aimed at 
building a new state, enabling East Timor’s transition from a territory occupied by Indonesia to 
a full-fledged member of the international community of sovereign states’ (Caplan 2005; Wolff & 
Dursun-Özkanca 2012: 302).
Agenda for Peace contextualized the changing international environment in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War and acknowledged that the ‘sources of conflict and war are pervasive 
and deep’ and that they require the international community’s ‘utmost effort to enhance respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, [and] to promote sustainable economic and social 
development for wider prosperity’ (UNSG 1992: Paragraph 5). Referring to the ‘complex’ concept 
of international security and underlining the nexus between security and development, Boutros-
Ghali noted, ‘Poverty, disease, famine, oppression and despair … are both sources and conse-
quences of conflict that require the ceaseless attention and the highest priority in the efforts of the 
United Nations’ (UNSG 1992: Paragraph 13).
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Additionally, An Agenda for Development (UNSG 1994) in 1994 and the Brahimi Report in 2000 
represent some of the earlier attempts on the part of the UN to encourage a better alignment 
of the UN’s security and development responsibilities for enhancing its performance in peace-
making, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction (Tschirgi 2005). In Agenda for Develop-
ment, Boutros-Ghali referred to development as ‘a fundamental human right’ and underlined that 
‘development is the most secure basis for peace’ (UNSG 1994: Paragraph 3) but also went on 
to declare development to be ‘in crisis’ (UNSG 1994: Paragraph 5). He referred to ‘peace as the 
foundation’ of development, noting that ‘Development cannot proceed easily in societies where 
military concerns are at or near the centre of life’ (UNSG 1994: Paragraph 17). He maintained that 
in the absence of peace, countries may ‘devote a higher percentage of their budget to the military 
than to development needs in health, education and housing’ as ‘preparation for war absorbs inor-
dinate resources and impedes the development of social institutions’ (UNSG 1994: Paragraph 17).
In 2005, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, then UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan underlined the importance of the connections between develop-
ment, security, and human rights by referring to the concept of ‘a larger freedom,’ noting that it 
‘encapsulates the idea that development, security and human rights go hand in hand’ (UNSG 
2005: 5). In the same report, Annan (UNSG 2005: 5–6) continued to argue:
Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security 
without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.  
Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed. In this new millennium, the work 
of the United Nations must move our world closer to the day when all people have the 
freedom to choose the kind of lives they would like to live, the access to the resources that 
would make those choices meaningful and the security to ensure that they can be enjoyed 
in peace.
Annan added, ‘Extreme poverty has many causes, ranging from adverse geography through poor 
or corrupt governance (including neglect of marginalized communities) to the ravages of conflict 
and its aftermath’ (UNSG: 12). Referring to the concept of ‘poverty traps,’ Annan argued that 
many of the world’s poorest countries are left ‘languishing in a vicious circle of destitution,’ and 
‘these countries cannot afford the basic investments needed to move onto a new path of prosperity 
unless they receive sustained, targeted external support’ (UNSG 2005: 12). 
Finally, as the mandate of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was set to expire in 
2015, the UN adopted The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which contains 17 SDGs 
(UNGA 2015). Agenda 2030 is ‘the result of over two years of intensive public consultation and 
engagement with civil society and other stakeholders around the world, which paid particular 
attention to the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable’ (UNGA 2015: 3). Through Agenda 
2030, between 2015 and 2030, the UN resolves to:
end poverty and hunger everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among countries; 
to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; to protect human rights and promote gender 
equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to ensure the lasting protection of 
the planet and its natural resources … [and] to create conditions for sustainable, inclusive 
and sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work for all, taking into 
account different levels of national development and capacities (UNGA 2015: 3). 
Agenda 2030 aims to address factors that lead to violence, insecurity, injustice, inequality, cor-
ruption, poor governance, and illicit financial and arms flows (UNGA 2015). SDG-16 emerges as 
particularly key to this agenda. Very much like In Larger Freedom, Agenda 2030 notes, ‘Sustain-
able development cannot be realized without peace and security; and peace and security will be 
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at risk without sustainable development’ (UNGA 2015: 9). Through SDG-16, it acknowledges the 
importance of building ‘peaceful, just, and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice 
and that are based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), on effective 
rule of law and good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and accountable insti-
tutions’ (UNGA 2015: 9). Inclusivity is key, especially of women and youth. Agenda 2030 notes, 
‘We must redouble our efforts to resolve or prevent conflict and to support post-conflict coun-
tries, including through ensuring that women have a role in peacebuilding and state-building’ 
(UNGA 2015: 9).
d. Other international organizations’ approaches  
to the security-development nexus
Besides the UN, the OECD has been a leading international actor on the security-development 
nexus, as it highlights the relationship between SSR and sustainable development. The SSR con-
cept itself has been regularly promoted by its Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), 
which has 30 member states that work on development cooperation, performance monitoring, and 
assessment (OECD 2020a). Indicative of the importance attributed to the security-development 
nexus, OECD-DAC’s work on SSR, accountability, and democratic governance, poverty reduc-
tion, and effective donor policies has been influential in determining the accepted standards of 
behavior in the fields of peace/security and development. OECD-DAC has promoted SSR, leading 
to SSR’s legitimization as a ‘development activity’ (Baldassini et al. 2018: 43). For the 2018–2022 
period, for instance, OECD-DAC announced its goal as the promotion of ‘development co-oper-
ation and other relevant policies’ in service of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, through 
‘sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, [and] improvement of 
living standards in developing countries’ (OECD 2020a). 
The WB similarly emphasizes the linkages between security and development. To illustrate, in 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring, it issued its World Development Report (WB 2011), focusing on 
the nexus between conflict, security, and development. In its 2017 World Development Report, 
it emphasized the impact of good governance on reducing violence through ‘effective deterrence, 
equitable distribution of resources, and legitimate dispute resolution’ (Bisca 2018). More recently, 
the WB engaged in a greater synergy with the UN. The two organizations published the Securing 
Development report in 2017 and the Pathways for Peace document in 2018 (UN-WB 2018). The 
Securing Development report called for financial transparency and oversight on expenses over 
security and justice institutions and proposed expenditure analysis in SSR missions (Harborne 
et al. 2017). 
In Pathways for Peace, the UN and WB (2018) argue that the prevention of conflict contributes 
to development progress. Subsequently, they recommend increased collaboration between the 
security and development circles and advocate that development actors should ‘provide more sup-
port to national and regional prevention agendas through targeted, flexible, and sustained engage-
ment,’ and that ‘Prevention agendas, in turn, should be integrated into development policies and 
efforts, because prevention is cost-effective, saves lives, and safeguards development gains’ (UN 
and WB 2018: xviii). The Pathways for Peace further endorses investing in ‘inclusive and sustain-
able development,’ and argues, ‘addressing inequalities and exclusion, making institutions more 
inclusive, and ensuring that development strategies are risk-informed are central to preventing 
the fraying of the social fabric that could erupt into crisis’ (UN and WB 2018: xviii). Accordingly, 
there is now a formal partnership between the WB Group and the UN, titled The World Bank 
Group-UN Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations, which focuses on over 40 coun-
tries facing fragility, conflict, and violence (Bousquet 2019).
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The EU has been another leading international actor when it comes to the security-development 
nexus. As it emerges as a leading actor in SSR (Sedra 2006a; Dursun-Özkanca 2012; 2014), it 
highlights the importance of a ‘holistic’ rather than a ‘piece-by-piece approach adopted by 
other actors, such as NATO and its predominant focus on defence reform’ (Dursun-Özkanca & 
Vandemoortele 2012: 145). In 2000, the EU outlined a number of priority areas of civilian action 
with an emphasis on SSR. These priority areas included police reform, the rule of law, strengthen-
ing of civilian administrations, and civil protection (Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012). 
In 2003, the European Security Strategy explicitly referred to SSR as a priority for the EU and also 
noted, ‘Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade 
and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda’ (The Council of the EU 2003: 13). In 
2005, the EU adopted the EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform, identifying 
the main guidelines for EU’s engagement in SSR (CEU 2005). In 2016, the European Union Global 
Strategy document made references to SSR and the need to ‘deliver security within the rule of law’ 
(European External Action Service [EEAS] 2016: 26). In its 2019 update on its Global Strategy 
implementation, the EU referred to its involvement in the Tunisian and the Iraqi SSR processes 
(EEAS 2019). The EU holds that the security-development nexus is central for the success of 
reconstruction efforts. The EU’s Africa Peace Facility, a major financial instrument to support 
cooperation with Africa on matters related to peace and security, is a good illustration of how the 
EU links development and security with an emphasis on peace, safety, security, political stability, 
effective governance, and sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commission 2019). 
e. The security-development nexus debate in academia and policymaking
As is the case with the key documents adopted by international organizations on the security-
development nexus, many scholars acknowledge that development and security reinforce each 
other and that they ‘need to go hand in hand’ (Duffield 2001; Zoellick 2008: 5). Just recently, 
in December 2020, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2553, ‘stressing that 
reforming the security sector in post-conflict environments is critical to the consolidation of peace 
and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate 
State authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict,’ and that ‘a professional, 
effective, and accountable security sector and accessible and impartial law-enforcement and jus-
tice sectors are equally necessary to laying the foundations for peace and sustainable development’ 
(UNSC 2020b). The logic is that development enhances security as a result of peace dividends 
and that security makes longer-term development possible. The argument here is that violence 
is linked to ‘poverty, inequality, and absence of opportunities’ (Collinson et al. 2010: 5), and civil 
wars not only have ‘adverse consequences for development,’ but also are ‘a failure of development’ 
(World Bank 2003: ix, emphasis in original). During civil wars, countries’ economic growth slows 
down by about 2.2% when compared to peace time (Collier 1999). Therefore, the World Bank 
(2003: 13) report refers to civil wars as ‘development in reverse.’ 
By responding to political instability and violence, providing property rights and enforceable 
contracts, and tackling corruption, fragile countries can escape the ‘fragility trap’ and enjoy sus-
tained economic growth (Andrimihaja et al. 2011). Violence and fear of violence have important 
economic costs for societies, because violence generates ‘costs in the form of property damage, 
physical injury or psychological trauma’ and fear of violence changes ‘investment and consump-
tion patterns’ (IEP 2020: 42). The economic costs of ‘preventing and dealing with the conse-
quences of violence divert public and private resources away from productive activities,’ and are 
divided into three categories: ‘direct costs, indirect costs, and a multiplier effect’ (IEP 2020: 42). 
The direct costs have ‘immediate consequences on the victims, perpetrators, and public systems 
including health, judicial and public safety’ (IEP 2020: 42). The indirect cost of violence includes 
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longer-term costs, such as ‘lost productivity, psychological effects and the impact of violence 
on the perception of safety and security in society’ (IEP 2020: 42). The multiplier effect ‘represents 
the economic benefits that would be generated by the diversion of expenditure away from sunk 
costs … into more productive alternatives that would better improve the economy’ (IEP 2020: 42). 
The direct and indirect costs of violence effectively illustrate the importance of violence-prevention 
in enhancing economic welfare. 
Therefore, many scholars argue that development may be seen as a ‘means to reduce violence 
and enhance peace and stability’ (Bergenas and Mahoney 2016; Collinson et al. 2010: 5; Zoellick 
2008). They note that ‘active support from security and defense players may actually improve the 
sustainability of development operations in fragile and failing states, which saw a 9.3 percent drop 
in allocated [Official Development Assistance] ODA since 2013’ (Bergenas & Mahoney 2016). 
This is referred to as ‘securing development’ in terms of ‘simultaneity rather than sequencing’ by 
Zoellick (2008: 5), who argues that both development and security communities should recog-
nize the importance of addressing security and development challenges simultaneously. A good 
example to this model is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Zoellick 2008).
Some scholars argue that much progress has been made to merge the development and secu-
rity policies and to create an inclusive, organic, and transparent network (Duffield 2001: 35–36). 
Others note that there is room for improvement and recommend having ‘more interaction on 
the ground between security and development staff ’ in order to enable better communication on 
‘their respective interests, capabilities, and limitations’ (Zoellick 2008: 5). While many point out 
the synergy between security/peace and development, there are some that draw attention to poten-
tial hazards. For instance, development aid may increase ‘the risks of atrocity crimes’ (SDG-16 
Conference 2019: 12). The leading experts therefore call for the development and security actors 
to keep their obligation to ‘do no harm’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 12). 
Critical scholars like Duffield (2007) draw attention to ‘securitising development’ (Quoted in 
Collinson et al. 2010: 5). They highlight the ‘continuing tension’ between development and secu-
rity circles, where the former ‘remains highly diffident, defensive and sometimes openly hostile 
to much of what may be seen as falling under the banner of stabilisation,’ due to anxieties about 
‘the goals of humanitarian action’ (Collinson et al. 2010: 4). They note that the simultaneous con-
duct of development assistance and counterterrorism operations may lead to confusion about the 
objectives of the development missions. This is especially the case when ‘military troops become 
actively engaged in humanitarian or development assistance activities,’ leading to difficulty in the 
eyes of the local populations ‘to separate the aid community from fighting forces’ (Schnabel & 
Farr: 2012: 13).
On a related point, some experts point to the politicization of the relationship between security 
and development during the Cold War (Duffield 2001) and the War on Terror (Wulf 2011). For 
instance, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush Administration’s first 
National Security Strategy focused on the failed states. Failed states often serve as ‘safe havens and 
staging grounds for terrorist organizations,’ undermine regional stability with ‘significant eco-
nomic and security costs to neighboring states,’ and create refugee flows, trafficking, and lost trade 
and investment opportunities (Rice 2003). This has created a more security-centered approach 
towards failed states, rather than a more development-centered approach. 
Accordingly, many are alarmed by the military ‘increasingly aiming to co-opt the NGO commu-
nity under a discourse based on the need to break cultural barriers and misunderstandings, and 
the assumption of sharing common goals’ (Ferreiro 2012). They contend that increased linkages 
between security and development are ‘an attempt to subordinate help to poor people to the short-
term security concerns of Western nation states and their elites’ (Bueger & Vennesson 2009: 4). 
They add that ‘military relief operations within counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies and the 
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mushrooming of militarized contractors have contributed to greater confusion’ (Ferreiro 2012). 
Others emphasize the challenges of coordinating development and security policies and address-
ing the ‘root causes’ of fragility and conflict (Bueger & Vennesson 2009). Their criticism is that 
security and development are ‘extremely broad and elusive concepts’ (Bueger & Vennesson 2009; 
Tschirgi 2005: 4). 
Many analysts caution against short-term relief action hurting ‘long-term capacity develop-
ment’ (Blind 2019: 3; Schnabel & Farr 2012; Wolff & Dursun-Özkanca 2012). Others argue that 
security and development concerns have rarely been linked in an institutional framework and 
attract attention to the existence of ‘rigidly divided disciplinary approaches and organisational 
structures’ that do not meet ‘people’s needs on the ground’ (Krause & Jütersonke 2005; Schnabel 
& Farr 2012: 12). They give the example of the ‘unevenness’ with which the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) ‘applies a conflict-sensitive lens to its development interventions, even when 
these take place in fragile, conflict and post-conflict settings’ (Schnabel & Farr 2012: 12). Such 
critics note that even though development and security/peace activities pursue similar goals, they 
‘invest little effort in learning from each other’s experience,’ and applying it in their own activities 
(Schnabel & Farr 2012: 15). Against this background, it is important to note that Agenda 2030 and 
the SDGs are an attempt to respond to such criticisms, as they link peace and security as well as 
development concerns in an institutional framework. Having established the dynamics between 
security and development, this manuscript next provides an overview of the literature on SSG/R, 




a. The literature on SSG/R
SSR is a relatively novel and evolving concept that originally emerged out of scholarship on civil-
military relations (CMR) (Bruneau & Matei 2008; Chuter 2006; Crossley-Frolick & Dursun-
Özkanca 2012; Edmunds 2007). As noted above, it was first coined by Short (Sedra 2010), who first 
proposed that security and sustainable development are inextricably linked (Dursun-Özkanca & 
Vandemoortele 2012). SSR and SSG have received increasing recognition for their contributions 
to effective democratization, good governance, sustaining peace, conflict prevention, and post-
conflict reconstruction since the end of the 1990s (Hänggi 2003; OECD 2008; Dursun-Özkanca 
2014; UN Peacekeeping 2020). The security sector is defined by the OECD-DAC as: 
core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and 
immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight 
bodies (e.g. ministries of defense and internal affairs, financial management bodies and 
public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, 
prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces 
(e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia) (OECD 2005: 5). 
The UN defines SSR as: 
a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation 
led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and account-
able security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for 
human rights and the rule of law (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2012: 2). 
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SSG is the application of the principles of good governance, such as accountability, transparency, 
rule of law, participation, responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency to a state’s security sec-
tor (The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF] 2015). It involves 
both ‘the formal and informal influences of all the structures, institutions and actors involved 
in provision, management and oversight of security and justice at national and local levels’ 
(Myrttinen 2019: 13). It sees justice and security as public goods and hence calls for the establish-
ment of ‘transparent policies and practices’ that are ‘within a framework for democratic govern-
ance that respects human rights and the rule of law’ (Myrttinen 2019: 13). In that sense, it not only 
involves the formal actors, but also includes informal and non-state actors in security provision 
and oversight.
Good SSG should be regarded as ‘the goal,’ whereas ‘SSR, or security sector transformation, is a 
way of getting there’ (Myrttinen 2019: 14). In other words, if there are problems with the adminis-
tration of SSG in a particular country in a way that its security sector ‘is not inclusive, is partial and 
corrupt, unresponsive, incoherent, ineffective and inefficient and/or unaccountable to the public,’ 
that country’s security sector is in need of reform (Schnabel 2012: 53). SSR is ‘often targeted at 
specific parts of the justice and security sector, e.g. police reform, justice reform or penal reform’ 
(Myrttinen 2019: 14). As noted by OECD-DAC (2007: 10), SSR aims at:
i) the improvement of basic security and justice service delivery, ii) the establishment of an 
effective governance, oversight and accountability system; and iii) the development of local 
leadership and ownership of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs 
of the security system. 
SSG emphasizes that there should be clear guidelines for security provision along with independ-
ent oversight to ensure that these guidelines are properly implemented by the authorities. It further 
highlights the availability of information to those who are affected by decisions on the security 
sector and their implementation. Rule of law has a central place in SSG, as the expectation is that 
all the laws are enforced consistently, impartially, and in line with the international and national 
human rights laws and norms. Inclusivity is similarly important for SSG, meaning that ‘all men 
and women of all backgrounds have the opportunity to participate in decision-making and service 
provision on a free, equitable and inclusive basis, either directly or through legitimate representa-
tive institutions’ (DCAF 2015: 3). SSG also places high importance on responsiveness to ensure 
that security and justice institutions are sensitive to the needs of the whole of the population and 
‘perform their missions in the spirit of a culture of service’ (DCAF 2015: 3). Finally, effectiveness 
and efficiency are important in SSG, so that the institutions fulfill their responsibilities within the 
bounds of high professional standards and ‘make the best possible use of public resources’ when 
fulfilling their responsibilities (DCAF 2015: 3). 
Since the 1990s, SSG principles have been disseminated by a variety of organizations, such as 
the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the OECD-DAC, the 
EU, and the African Union (AU) (DCAF 2015). Similarly, the UN Secretary-General’s reports on 
SSR dated 2008 and 2013 ‘endorsed the principles of good SSG’ (DCAF 2015: 8). In the aftermath 
of the Cold War, numerous factors brought about the development and evolution of the SSG/R 
literature. Such factors include concerns of donor countries about how conflicts hinder sustain-
able development in the developing parts of the world (Brzoska 2000; Hendrickson & Karkoszka 
2002; Law & Myshlovska 2008), the rechanneling of defense/security-related financial resources 
to development projects (Brzoska 2000, 2003; Hänggi 2009), and a novel emphasis on governance, 
transparency, accountability, and democratic CMR in countries that were undergoing political 
transitions, especially from authoritarian to democratic regimes, in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Brzoska 2000; Chanaa 2002; Hänggi 2009). Also included among these factors are Western gov-
ernments’ desire to promote good governance and reform the military, police, border guards, 
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and judicial institutions (Brzoska 2000; Chanaa 2002; Hänggi 2009), a new understanding of 
security in the form of the concept of human security (Ball and Hendrickson 2009; Doelle & 
de Harven 2008; Hänggi 2003; Sedra 2006a, 2006b), a surge of the importance of peacebuilding 
in post-conflict settings (Brzoska 2000; Hänggi 2009; Law & Myshlovska 2008), and an empha-
sis on transitional justice in post-conflict settings (Crossley-Frolick & Dursun-Özkanca 2012; 
Dursun-Özkanca & Crossley-Frolick 2012). More recently, the SSG principles and SSR have 
become even more important against the background of ‘a growing trend towards authoritarian-
ism, as institutions, including the judiciary, become less independent and less able to constrain 
government powers’ (The 2019 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, quoted in the Global 
Alliance 2019: 114). In its Resolution 2553 passed in early December 2020, the UNSC reiterated 
its commitment to SSG/R as well as Agenda 2030 (UNSC 2020b).
There is a multitude of works in the SSG/R literature that examine the role played by external 
actors in conducting SSR (Bryden 2007; Caparini 2003; Dursun-Özkanca 2014; Spence & Fluri 
2008; Tadesse 2010; Vetschera and Damian 2006). In 2014, UNSC Resolution 2151 reempha-
sized the importance of the national or local ownership concept in SSR and encouraged states to 
incorporate ‘an inclusive national vision,’ based on the local population’s needs. The resolution 
also called for better integration of SSR into broader national political processes, and emphasized 
the centrality of monitoring and evaluation SSR, and ‘strengthening support to sector-wide ini-
tiatives that enhance the governance and performance of the security sector’ (UN Peacekeeping 
2020). Nonetheless, the challenge of ensuring local ownership remains in SSR implementation, 
and there is disagreement in the literature over the connection between SSG/R, local owner-
ship, and statebuilding, and ‘whether international administrations represent an imperial enter-
prise or are a welcome form of providing governance for states emerging from conflict’ (Peter 
2013: 435). Which and what kind of local actors to involve, when to make the transition to local 
ownership, and the logistics/resources through which ownership is practiced all emerge as key 
items in the local ownership agenda (Caplan 2006; Chesterman 2007; Dursun-Özkanca 2018; 
Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012; Narten 2008). When SSR has ‘political traction and 
national ownership,’ it helps to facilitate establishing rule of law, to fight against impunity, and to 
restore ‘the social contract on which stability depends’ (UN Peacekeeping 2020). Therefore, the 
current manuscript allocates special attention to the concept of local ownership as it relates to 
the linkages between SSG/R and SDG-16. It also sheds light on the interconnections between 
SSG/R and SDG-16 in terms of oversight and accountability.
i. SSG/R and development
SSR has hybrid origins going back to both security and development literatures. It is a ‘highly inter-
sectional concept’ that relies on ‘effective collaboration and linking of security and development 
needs assessments, conducted and implemented by actors from both communities’ (Schnabel 
2012: 55). It has roots in the development donor debate on how to more effectively target and 
implement development assistance in security-related fields (Baldassini et al. 2018; Brzoska 2003). 
In this context, it is important to talk about political conditionality, because democratic princi-
ples, human rights, and good governance are typically presented ‘as a condition for economic 
assistance’ (Wulf 2011: 353). Therefore, the debates on SSG/R frequently mirror the discussions 
provided in the security-development nexus section above. 
SSR and development reinforce each other. It serves to advance both human security and 
human development (Schnabel & Farr 2012). In his 2008 report on SSR, then UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon criticized the UN’s involvement in SSR as piecemeal and lacking a common 
framework and a coherent system-wide approach and called for a ‘holistic and coherent United 
Nations approach’ to SSR in order to ‘provide a basis for a transparent framework for reform and 
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international principles consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and human rights laws 
and standards’ (UNSG 2008: 2). He added that the provision of assistance on SSR would also 
‘increase the effectiveness and efficiency’ of the UN peacekeeping operations, ‘facilitating early 
recovery from conflict and helping to build the conditions necessary for sustainable peace and 
development’ (UNSG 2008: 2). 
The legitimacy and effectiveness of SSR missions have important repercussions on fragile 
states’ capability to build and pay for their ‘own reliable police and armed forces’ (Zoellick 2008: 
6). While ‘Properly organized and trained, local police and military are key to securing public 
support, gaining intelligence, and sustaining security,’ ‘ill-trained forces’ that undermine the 
government’s legitimacy run the risk of perpetuating or making an already-destructive situa-
tion worse (Zoellick 2008: 6). Consequently, effective SSR and disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration (DDR) through ‘job training and placement for ex-combatants’ are critical for 
peacebuilding (Zoellick 2008: 6). This emphasizes the significance of the security-development 
nexus in SSR.
SSR and development communities share common goals, including a commitment to peace 
and justice ‘via consultative and bottom-up programme planning’ (Winkler 2012: vii). Conse-
quently, ‘short-cutting SSR, particularly by failing to take the governance dimensions seriously 
and pursuing SSR in isolation from larger development and governance reform priorities’ may 
lead to further instability (Schnabel & Farr 2012: 12). SSR missions should be informed by SSG. 
Otherwise, in the long run, they ‘may turn out to be counterproductive not just to SSR aims, but to 
development and peace-building objectives as well’ (Schnabel & Farr 2012: 12–13). Accordingly, 
there are calls for a more systematic collection of empirical evidence to demonstrate how SSR and 
development ‘inter-operate’ (Farr, Schnabel & Krupanski 2012: 336). 
Additionally, many note an enduring prejudice in the donor community against working with 
security sector players, especially the military (Brzoska 2003). On this topic, Farr, Schnabel and 
Krupanski (2012: 327) ask the development community ‘to step up and assume responsibility, 
leadership and ownership,’ adding that ‘It does not serve anyone to remain passive and simply 
criticise.’ They conclude, ‘Stove-piping of assistance missions between security and development 
communities is counterproductive to sustainable reforms, change, stability and poverty reduction’ 
(Farr, Schnabel & Krupanski 2012: 327). 
Others recommend that SSR be ‘implemented as a companion to development assistance’ ‘as a 
long-term project, designed in a participatory and inclusive manner in collaboration with state 
and non-state actors,’ with a focus on local ownership and good governance and warn that half-
hearted SSR activities that fall short of these criteria ‘will do more harm than good’ (Schnabel 
2012: 54). For instance, in 2014, UNSC 2151 emphasized the importance of SSG/R and reassured 
that member states are ‘committed to improving the contributions and relevance of security sector 
reform to the wider development agenda’ (UN Peacekeeping 2020). SSR and SSG are both ‘pre-
ventive’ measures as well as ‘long-term development’ goals (UN Peacekeeping 2020). Illustrating 
the linkages between security and development, the UN utilizes SSR not only in its peace opera-
tions, but also in ‘non-mission settings, in response to national requests, and in transition settings, 
where peace operations are withdrawing but where ongoing security sector assistance is needed’ 
(UN Peacekeeping 2020). 
In post-conflict societies, SSR ‘is a determining factor for the exit of a peacekeeping operation, 
early recovery, sustainable peacebuilding and longer-term development,’ and ‘is a sine qua non 
for sustainable economic and political development’ (UN Peacekeeping 2020). For instance, if 
police reform, a common component of SSR, is effectively administered, it will curb corruption 
and inefficiencies in the police force, leading to more criminals being brought to justice (Dursun-
Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012). If justice reform, another common component of SSR, has not 
been reformed properly, those criminals may escape justice by bribing their way out (Larivé 2012). 
Therefore, it is important to engage in ‘a holistic, comprehensive and broadly defined approach 
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that includes many if not all security-providing institutions in the society’ (Dursun-Özkanca & 
Vandemoortele 2012; Schnabel & Farr: 2012: 13). 
SSR circles have learned lessons from both development and security communities and the 
practitioners of SSR increasingly acknowledge that the security sector should be addressed as a 
whole (Faleg 2012). Even then, greater synergy between SSR and development activities through 
a deeper emphasis on mutual planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and assessment of 
these activities may ‘enhance each other’s positive impact on society’ (Schnabel & Farr 2012: 11). 
Much lip service has been paid to this synergy on paper, nevertheless, there have been sig-
nificant gaps in the implementation of these ideals (Schnabel & Farr 2012; Wolff & Dursun- 
Özkanca 2012). 
ii. Critiques of the SSR-development nexus
The literature on SSG/R recognizes that each security sector is interlinked at least in principle, 
‘but remains lacking in its practical implementation’ (Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012: 
151). As warned by a recent study, if SSR’s ‘development roots’ are not recognized, ‘the supposed 
responsibility and professed enthusiasm of the SSR/G community towards upholding and serving 
broader development goals through SSR remain ambivalent at best’ (Baldassini et al. 2018: 43). 
Mirroring the discussions explained in the previous section, others attract attention to the risk of 
securitization in SSR (Buzan 2007; Schnabel & Farr 2012; Short 2014; Wulf 2011). They warn that 
when ‘armed forces simultaneously wage a military campaign and train local military or police,’ 
the important principles of SSR, such as civilian oversight or democratic governance may ‘get 
lost’ (Schnabel & Farr 2012: 13). Many experts emphasize the primacy of national interests in 
SSR missions (Justaert 2012), which indicate a favoring of the security aspect over development. 
Clare Short, the former UK Secretary of State for International Development, who first coined the 
term SSR in 1998 (Sedra 2010), warned that the SSR ‘concept might be deployed as a cover for 
interventions that focus less on the needs of local people and more on Western security interests’ 
(Short 2014: ix).
Moreover, there are heated debates about the need for long-term and ‘sustainable’ SSR 
approaches to deliver the desired outcomes (Schnabel & Farr 2012: 16). Many highlight that long-
term approaches ‘do not always gain the respect and support of short-sighted external actors’ 
who prefer a ‘highly technical approach’ that seeks ‘to replicate templates and blueprints that have 
worked for them at home’ (Schnabel and Farr 2012: 16). As Wolff and Dursun-Özkanca (2012: 
309) note, the fact that the ‘regional and international organisations do not often fail in their [self-
assigned] conflict management efforts’ is ‘partly due to a more realistic and cautious definition 
of mission mandates,’ which seek more ‘limited’ and ‘vaguely-defined goals,’ instead of ‘peace.’ 
Consequently, a more comprehensive security approach, ‘spanning a breadth of themes and actors 
when it comes to defining what security means and for whom, who should be involved in provid-
ing security and what role security plays for human development and vice versa,’ emerges as a 
central theme in SSR-development nexus (Baldassini et al. 2018: 38–39).
Other scholars further point out the dangers of institution building during an ongoing civil war 
or famine, by citing that corruption, war, and famine ‘fuel each other’ and ‘compound economic 
distress and strife’ (Athorpe 1997; Gaile & Ferguson 1996, quoted in Blind 2019). They note, 
‘Defaulting on comprehensive SSR in favour of quick-fix, politically opportunist approaches to do 
‘something’ with ‘someone’ will not win the trust of either the development or the security com-
munity’ (Baldassini et al. 2018: 39). Others like Wulf (2011: 342) identify a central dilemma in the 
SSR-development nexus, by posing the question: ‘Will SSR lead to a democratisation of the secu-
rity sector and thus contribute to development, or will development assistance be manipulated to 
function as a military “force multiplier”?’ They warn, ‘If the causes of insecurity are misperceived, 
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then programmes or suggested remedies might be inefficient or even counterproductive’ (Wulf 
2011: 353). Next, this manuscript delves into an overview of the literature on sustainable develop-
ment, Agenda 2030, and SDG-16.
b. The literature on sustainable development, Agenda 2030, and SDG-16
The sustainable development concept is derived from the Malthusian theory, which postulates 
that ‘human population tended to grow in a geometric progression, while subsistence could grow 
in only an arithmetic progression, and for that matter, population growth was likely to outstrip 
the capacity of the natural resources to support the needs of the increasing population’ (Mensah 
& Casadevall 2019: 6–7). It argues that if left unchecked, the population growth rate will deplete 
humans of natural resources (Mensah & Casadevall 2019). 
The origin of the modern concept of sustainable development goes back to 1983, to the founda-
tion of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). The Commission’s 
mandate was to ‘formulate realistic proposals’ for dealing with environment and development 
issues, ‘to propose new forms of international cooperation’ on such issues, and ‘to raise the levels 
of understanding and commitment to action of individuals, voluntary organizations, businesses, 
institutes, and governments’ (WCED 1987: 12). As stated in the WCED report, Our Common 
Future (also known as the Brundtland Report), which directly referred to the sustainable develop-
ment concept for the first time, ‘Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to 
ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987: 15). 
The concept of human development was ‘pioneered’ by Mahbub ul Haq, under UNDP’s leader-
ship, and ‘helped to shift the focus of development attention away from an overarching concen-
tration on the growth of inanimate objects of convenience, such as commodities produced… to 
the quality and richness of human lives’ (The Commission on Human Security 2003: 8). Human 
development aims at ‘removing the various hindrances that restrain and restrict human lives and 
prevent its blossoming’ (The Commission on Human Security 2003: 8). Human development 
literature tends ‘to concentrate on “growth with equity”’ (The Commission on Human Security 
2003: 8). Over time, the concept of development was deepened by underlining the importance of 
human security (Bueger & Vennesson 2009).
i. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
The Our Common Future report was followed by the UN Conference on the Environment and 
Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, the largest international 
gathering at the beginning of the 1990s (Paul 2008; Mensah & Casadevall 2019). Three years later, 
the international community negotiated the Kyoto Protocol (Paul 2008; Mensah & Casadevall 
2019). In 2000, the Millennium Summit was held in New York City, launching the eight MDGs 
(Paul 2008; Mensah & Casadevall 2019), which included: 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hun-
ger, 2) achieve universal primary education, 3) promote gender equality and empower women, 
4) reduce child mortality, 5) improve maternal health, 6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other 
diseases, 7) ensure environmental sustainability, and 8) develop a global partnership for develop-
ment (UN Millennium Declaration 2000).
As put by the UN Millennium Project (2005: 1), MDGs were ‘time-bound and quantified targets’ 
to address ‘extreme poverty’ and its various dimensions, such as ‘income poverty, hunger, disease, 
lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion,’ and to promote ‘gender equality, education, and environ-
mental sustainability.’ They are also ‘basic human rights’ as pledged in the Universal Declaration 
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of Human Rights and the UN Millennium Declaration (UN Millennium Project 2005: 1). They 
achieved some important outcomes, especially with regards to the anti-poverty movement (UN 
2015). As then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted in the Foreword of the last Millennium 
Development Goals Report in 2015 (UN 2015: 3), ‘The MDGs helped to lift more than one billion 
people out of extreme poverty, to make inroads against hunger, to enable more girls to attend 
school than ever before and to protect our planet.’ They also created ‘innovative partnerships, gal-
vanized public opinion and showed the immense value of setting ambitious goals’ (UN 2015: 3). 
They put ‘people and their immediate needs at the forefront’ of ‘decision-making in developed and 
developing countries alike’ (UN 2015: 3). 
Nevertheless, as acknowledged by Ban Ki-moon (UN 2015: 3), ‘inequalities persist and … progress 
has been uneven,’ as most of the world’s extremely poor people live in five countries, problems 
with women’s health continue, and disparities between urban and rural areas ‘remain pronounced’ 
(UN 2015: 3). The final Millennium Development Goals Report in 2015 emphasized that ‘conflicts 
remain the biggest threat to human development’ (UN 2015: 8). Therefore, the track record of the 
MDGs has been ‘uneven across regions and countries, leaving significant gaps,’ and ‘[m]illions of 
people are being left behind, especially the poorest and those disadvantaged because of their sex, 
age, disability, ethnicity or geographic location’ (UN 2015: 8).
Some in the literature criticized the assessment of the MDGs, claiming that the focus on the neg-
atives created a hurdle for further progress. To illustrate, Easterly (2009: 26) noted, ‘The statement 
that “Africa will miss all the MDGs” … has the unfortunate effect of making African successes 
look like failures.’ Others emphasized the missing goal of reduction of inequalities between the 
Global North and Global South (Fukuda-Parr 2010) and omitted focus on the poorest parts of 
the Global South due to the use of national averages and aggregated data (Brikci & Holder 2011). 
Yet others criticized the MDGs for their lack of focus on human rights and security (Fehling et al. 
2013; Hill et al. 2010; Waage et al. 2010; Ziai 2011). Finally, the MDGs received criticism for being 
‘addressed in isolation’ from one another and for the lack of ‘an inclusive consultation process’ 
during their formulation (International Institute for Sustainable Development [IISD] 2016). The 
lack of a consultative process is said to have contributed to ‘a lack of understanding of the Goals 
and their targets at the national level during the initial implementation stage’ (IISD 2016).
ii. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
The SDG process was initiated at the 2006 UN General Assembly, under the leadership of South 
African President Mbeki calling for the execution of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
adopted in 2002 (Dodds & Bartram 2016; Tosun & Leininger 2017). In 2012, the UN Conference 
on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), also known as Rio+ 20 was held, focusing on making 
sustainable development a key agenda item for the UN and the development of new SDGs begin-
ning in 2015 (Weitz et al. 2017). In 2015, the UN adopted its Agenda 2030, containing 17 SDGs, 
and called member states to action ‘to end poverty, protect the planet and improve the lives and 
prospects of everyone, everywhere’ by 2030 (UN General Assembly 2015). It incorporated five Ps: 
‘people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnerships’ (Guo 2017; Hylton 2019; Mensah & Casadevall 
2019; Zhai & Chang 2019). At the UN Sustainable Development Summit in 2015, ‘a global pro-
cess of social and political adaptation to limits posed by the natural resource base’ was initiated 
(Tosun & Leininger 2017: 1). UN’s Agenda 2030 pledged ‘enhanced capacity-building support 
for developing countries, including the strengthening of national data systems and evaluation 
programmes, particularly in African countries, least developed countries, small island developing 
States, landlocked developing countries and middle-income countries’ (UNGA 2015: 32). Collec-
tion of systematic data at the national level will help better achieve the targets of SDG-16 (DCAF, 
OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women 2019: 9). But here, a major negative factor is that some states 
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‘shy away from collecting data that may be embarrassing, such as data related to corruption and 
bribery’ (Hope 2020b: 73).
Following the MDGs, the SDGs are 17 goals, which represented ‘a break with the traditional 
global approach to spurring sustainable development (which was, inter alia, based on the negotia-
tion of intergovernmental agreements that largely promoted a “work in silos” approach)’ (IISD 
2016). Furthermore, the process of constructing the national SDG plans was also drastically dif-
ferent than the process during the MDGs (IISD 2016). The SDGs, unlike their predecessor MDGs, 
were able to incorporate feedback from a variety of constituencies and sought to deepen the col-
laboration with various stakeholders. 
As noted in the UNDP Support for the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal-16 
(UNDP 2016: 4) document, ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of the MDGs show that 
progress towards achieving the MDGs was often hampered by conflict, a lack of rule of law and 
weak institutions.’ As the Report of the Secretary-General (UNSG 2013: 6) acknowledges, ‘While 
in the Millennium Declaration of 2000 states recognized the importance of peacebuilding and 
citizen security, those concerns were not adequately reflected in the Millennium Development 
Goals.’ Hence, the specific goals and targets of the MDGs ‘did not incorporate key security, human 
rights and rule of law factors that form the basis for development’ (UNSG 2013: 6). Accordingly, 
there were ‘calls for an increased focus on security in defining the post-Millennium Development 
Goal agenda,’ which were addressed through the dialogue via the Global Thematic Consultation 
on Conflict, Violence and Disaster from July 2012 to March 2013 (UNSG 2013: 6). 
The international community drew important lessons from the MDGs, especially when it comes 
to acknowledging the significance of governance as an explanatory factor for the uneven track 
record of countries on the MDGs (The Global Alliance 2019). The SDGs are universal, integrated, 
and indivisible (Tosun & Leininger 2017; UNGA 2015; Weitz et al. 2017). Unlike the MDGs, there 
are many intersectoral SDGs that reinforce each other (Nilsson et al. 2016). For instance, SDG-10 
and SDG-16 are generally regarded as prerequisites for accomplishing other SDGs (Tosun & Lei-
ninger 2017). SDG-16 is particularly identified as an ‘enabler’ of other goals by many (SDG-16 
Conference 2019; Tosun & Leininger 2017: 5). SDG-10 and SDG-16 ‘serve to guide investments 
in human capital development, poverty eradication, inequality reduction and boosting inclusion, 
thus helping reduce bases for conflict’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 2) and ‘serve as catalysts for 
achieving many other SDG targets’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 6). 
‘Policy integration’ is an important pre-condition for successful implementation of Agenda 
2030 (Tosun & Leininger 2017: 10). Therefore, many studies put emphasis on the monitoring, 
assessment, implementation, and governance innovation of the SDGs (Allen et al. 2018; Kanie & 
Biermann 2017; Mensah and Casadevall 2019; Tosun & Leininger 2017). There is the Mainstream-
ing, Acceleration and Policy Support (MAPS) process that the UN uses to help member states 
integrate the SDGs into their national development processes (The Global Alliance 2019). In that 
context, there is a key partnership, titled ‘The New Deal’ between G7+ countries and OECD-DAC 
donors that was established in 2011. It ‘recognizes the nexus between peace and development and 
guides the effective engagement of actors in conflict-affected countries’ through ‘peacebuilding 
and statebuilding goals,’ such as ‘inclusive and legitimate politics, security and justice, economic 
foundation and revenue and services’ (The Global Alliance 2019: 48). It highlights ‘the importance 
of addressing the underlying causes of conflict’ (UNSG 2013: 6). Finally, the High-Level Politi-
cal Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), which is the main UN platform on sustainable 
development, has a vital role in the ‘follow-up and review’ of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, 
especially at the global level (UN General Assembly 2016). 
On the assessment and furthering of SDG-16, there is a coordination platform called the Global 
Alliance for Reporting Progress on Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies (also known as the 
SDG-16 Alliance or the Global Alliance). It coordinates action on the part of the UN Member 
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States, the private sector, and civil society organizations (CSOs) to advance the goal of estab-
lishing peace, justice, and strong institutions.  It functions as ‘the international system’s only 
multi-stakeholder platform for joint decision-making and action at the global and national 
level,’ emphasizing ‘evidence-based and multi-stakeholder action’ (The Global Alliance 2020). 
For instance, it publishes the SDG16+ reports globally, and aims at accelerating progress on 
SDG-16 targets. The term ‘SDG-16+,’ is ‘coined to reflect the linkages between goals and targets 
beyond SDG-16 that embody commitments to peace, justice, and inclusion across all the SDGs’ 
(The Global Alliance 2019: 18). It attracts attention to the interdependence between SDG-16 
and ‘the 24 other targets of other SDGs that directly measure an aspect of peace, justice and inclu-
sion’ (The Global Alliance 2019: 18). 
Besides the Global Alliance, other cross-country initiatives providing technical support to UN 
member states and civil society organizations on the implementation of SDGs across peace, jus-
tice, and inclusion include the Transparency, Accountability and Participation (TAP) Network, 
Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies, 16 Plus Forum, the Effective Institutions 
Platform (EIP), the Sustainable Development Goals Fund (SDGF), the Partnership Against 
Corruption Initiative (PACI), SDG-16 Data Initiative and the Open Government Partnership 
(OGP), and the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) (The Global Alliance 2019). 
Many engage in public-private partnerships (PPPs) to support SDG-16+.

CHAPTER 3
SDG-16: Content and Controversies
a. SDG-16 content
As noted earlier, security and development spheres have only been brought together con­
cretely recently under the institutional framework of the SDGs. Prior to the SDGs, develop­
ment actors did not show much interest in security affairs and security circles did not 
sufficiently emphasize development. Furthermore, the security­development nexus section 
already discussed the enduring skepticism between the development and security circles against 
each other. 
The SDGs in general, and SDG­16 in particular, incorporate both development­ and peace/
security­related targets. SDG­16 emphasizes peacebuilding, good governance, and sustainable 
development. It sets the goal of promoting just, peaceful, and inclusive societies. It specifically 
focuses on ending violence, promoting the rule of law, strengthening institutions, and increas­
ing access to justice through responsive and representative decision making and transparency 
(UN 2020a). In that sense, it contains elements that emphasize negative peace as well as positive 
peace (Radović 2019). To illustrate, it targets negative peace measures, such as physical violence 
and homicide rates, as well as positive peace measures, such as combating corruption, establishing 
the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and responsive, inclusive, participatory, and repre­
sentative decision making. 
SDG­16 is arguably the most ambitious among all 17 SDGs and will have a multiplier effect 
on other SDGs, as its mandate crosscuts the mandates of many other SDGs. In words of a recent 
study, ‘SDG­16 represents an unprecedented opportunity to launch a new era of pragmatic 
action that simultaneously works toward making poverty history, while mitigating the negative 
consequences from conflict and insecurity’ (Bergenas & Mahoney 2016). As noted by UNGA 
(2015: 25–26), SDG­16 contains the 12 targets listed in Table 1.
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Table 1: SDG-16 Targets.
16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere 
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and all forms of violence against and torture of children 
16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all 
16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of 
stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime 
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms 
16.6 Develop effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels 
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision making at all levels 
16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance 
16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration 
16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with 
national legislation and international agreements 
16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity 
at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime 
16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development
Source: UNGA (2015: 25–26).
Targets 16.a and 16.b are what are referred to as the Means of Implementation (MOI) Targets, 
which are included for all 17 SDG targets. They ‘draw specific attention to the enabling actions 
that underpin the achievement of the core SDG Targets and should be read in conjunction with 
SDG-17,’ which seeks to boost the means of implementation and reinvigorate the global partner-
ship for sustainable development (TAP Network 2016: 11). The above list of goals effectively illus-
trates the sentiment that is aptly summarized by the Global Alliance (2019: 20):
Without sustained peace, which goes beyond the mere absence of violence and includes 
respect for human rights and the rule of law, development gains are reversed. And without 
inclusion and access to justice for all, inequalities in poverty reduction and socio-economic 
development will increase and countries’ commitments to leaving no one behind will not 
be met.
While it is undoubtedly commendable that SDG-16 seeks to link security and development 
together, the path towards the adoption of SDG-16 has not been without challenges and con-
troversies. Next, this manuscript provides a brief summary of the debates that revolved around 
SDG-16 in linking the spheres of development and security together. Here, it is especially impor-
tant to unpack the criticisms coming from the development circles. 
b. SDG-16 controversies
Many in the development community warned about the potential dangers of linking the spheres 
of development and security together under SDG-16. They noted that this tendency is ‘alarm-
ing’ (Möller-Loswick 2017) and critics claimed that the international community is ‘securitizing 
development’ (Buzan 2007; Duffield 2001; Lazarus 2020: 166; Möller-Loswick 2017). First and 
foremost, security and development circles have been circumspect about working closely with 
each other, ‘due to uncertainty about the impact … it has on their preparedness and capacity 
to address their core business’ (Baldassini et al. 2018: 23). For instance, Lazarus (2020) voices 
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skepticism about the motivations behind SDG-16 and concludes, ‘What we see in SDG-16 is a 
goal of empowerment, but the licence it gives to the idea of crime control and the coercion of 
private violence isn’t always about empowerment. It is also about social control’ (Lazarus 2020: 
168). Möller-Loswick (2017) adds that ‘peace goal could put the wider development agenda at 
risk,’ as some international actors pursue ‘SDG16 to justify “securitised” and counter-produc-
tive approaches to development,’ by adopting ‘reactive, securitised and poorly thought-through 
responses to security threats.’ Besides ‘securitization,’ there are also concerns about ‘militariza-
tion’ or ‘misuse’ of development assistance ‘for military purposes’ (Schnabel & Farr 2012; Wulf 
2011: 342). As Wulf (2011: 342) notes, failed and failing states, post-conflict reconstruction, and 
the War on Terror ‘have given rise to efforts to use development assistance for military and stra-
tegic purposes’ (Wulf 2011: 342). 
Moreover, there are fears of ‘takeover by one agenda and one set of actors’ in the field. The con-
cern is that the cooperation between development and security circles ‘in the design and imple-
mentation of joint projects’ may lead to one group being dominated or undermined by the other 
using the excuse of ‘expediency and efficiency’ of the operation to ‘skew the nature of the joint 
activity’ (Baldassini et al. 2018: 24). Here, development circles are concerned that the security 
circles ‘will dominate and possibly take over’ due to their ‘more rigorous structure and culture, 
financial capacities, access and territorial reach’ (Baldassini et al. 2018: 24).
Additionally, more eyebrows were raised in the development community as a result of the 
changes made into the OECD-DAC ODA rules. In 2012, the OECD decided to modernize 
the ODA concept to more accurately reflect development activities in the official data. Given the 
high costs of meeting the goals of sustainable development mentioned at Rio+ 20, some donors 
wanted to incentivize different ways of using ODA for the least developed or more fragile coun-
tries. Two key areas of change were 1) updating, clarifying, and streamlining existing ODA 
reporting, and 2) expanding ODA to bring in new activities and financial instruments (Develop-
ment Initiatives 2017: 6). Accordingly, in 2016, OECD-DAC revised their rules for peace and 
security expenditures eligibility to ‘better recognise the marginal, but actual developmental role 
that military actors sometimes play, notably in conflict situations, while clearly delineating it 
from their main peace and security function’ (OECD 2020b: 3). These revisions sought to ‘clarify 
ambiguities to ensure uniform, consistent statistical reporting, but also to approve the ODA-
eligibility of development-related training for partner country military staff in limited topics’ 
(OECD 2020b: 3). 
The OECD-DAC has ‘implemented the updated ODA rules on peace and security in the report-
ing, issued a revised ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities, and complemented 
the technical review of the ODA coefficient applied to UN peacekeeping operations’ (OECD 
2020b: 3). According to these new guidelines, the OECD-DAC expanded ODA’s ‘definition to 
include additional activities such as preventing violent extremism, migration management and 
military costs for the delivery of humanitarian relief ’ to ‘potentially include more security-related 
activities … to encourage aid spending on SDG-16’ (Möller-Loswick 2017). Moreover, OECD-
DAC members may now report 15%, instead of the previous 7%, ‘of what they contribute to UN 
peacekeeping in their ODA figures’ (Möller-Loswick 2017). 
There are concerns in the development circles over the risks of ‘diverting aid more towards 
a military agenda for fighting wars rather than non-violent, preventative and developmental 
approaches’ (Möller-Loswick 2017). Skepticism is targeted towards the fact that before the update 
of OECD-DAC’s definition of ODA, there were ‘limitations … on the direct funding of security- 
related activities … [presenting] difficulties for support to certain SSR activities (Fitz-Gerald 
2012: 295). Fitz-Gerald (2012: 295) notes that donor countries like the UK, the Netherlands, 
and Canada, ‘created new funding mechanisms which stood independent of ODA and could be 
used to support more comprehensive SSR’ in order to ‘circumvent some of the more restrictive 
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ODA criteria.’ The critics warn that ‘it is not immediately clear what further expanding 
the definition of aid to include more security-related costs would achieve,’ as many activities that 
fall under SDG-16 would already count towards the ODA (Möller-Loswick 2017). They warn 
that the expansion of the definitions of ODA ‘could lead to a squeeze on spending on activities 
such as peacebuilding or humanitarian relief – already inadequate – as donors seek to reach ODA 
targets while spending more on hard security’ (Möller-Loswick 2017). The new definition of 
ODA containing certain security and defense costs, such as measures to prevent violent extrem-
ism and provide limited military training, may mean that ‘the operational and tactical require-
ments of such measures are often outside the scope of many development agencies, encouraging 
partnerships with military or  law enforcement agencies’ (Bergenas & Mahoney 2016). Skeptics 
fear that this new definition will sidetrack donors from traditional development goals, such as 
education and gender equality (Bergenas & Mahoney 2016) and are concerned that ‘donors’ secu-
rity interests are being prioritized at the expense of citizens in conflict-affected countries’ (Möller-
Loswick 2017). Nevertheless, it is important to draw attention to the fact that SSR aims to create 
professional security forces that work within the confines of democratic and rules-based frame-
works. Therefore, investing in SSR does not necessarily mean creating larger security apparatus. 
For instance, smaller but well-trained staff can make a major difference, especially in post-conflict 
contexts, replacing the corrupt or dysfunctional security apparatus. 
Another concern is that SDG-16, particularly Target 16.a, may be ‘used by the EU to justify 
“train and equip” assistance to security forces to foster peace and development’ (Möller-Loswick 
2017; Tricot O’Farrell 2016). The argument is that such train and equip assistance may go into 
countries that are not necessarily interested in reforming their security institutions, such as 
Ethiopia and Sudan. This, in turn, would potentially lead to less peace and more insecurity by 
‘reinforcing the problems that have fuelled instability and displacement in the first place’ (Möller-
Loswick 2017; Tricot O’Farrell 2016). 
A further concern about the SDG-16 is the difficulty of monitoring it due to ‘the complexity and 
evolving nature of the issues to measure, their political sensitivity and the fact that traditionally 
National Statistical Offices (NSOs) have not focused on SDG-16 related issues’ (SDG-16 Confer-
ence 2019: 3). For instance, due to ‘the sensitive nature of SDG 16 … some countries cling to the 
notion of strongly upholding their sovereignty and government dominance without internal or 
external interference’ (Hope 2020b: 67).
There are additional problems with the implementation of SDG-16 targets, such as ‘inadequate 
capacity’ of states, ‘poor data and information’ on security and justice sector indicators, ‘inad-
equate delivery systems,’ ‘insufficient financing,’ and ‘lack of political will and leadership’ (Hope 
2020b: 67–70). For instance, measuring SDG-16 presents additional challenges due to it being 
a new goal that was not previously listed under the MDG framework (Milante et al. 2015). As 
noted by UNDP (2017: 6), ‘[G]overnance is a fairly new domain in official statistics, with few 
international standards defining its measurement and few countries and statistical offices having 
experience in producing governance statistics.’ Therefore, coordination with a variety of stake-
holders, including different governments, civil society organizations, academics, and experts 
to identify national and global indicators become important (UNDP 2017). This allows for the 
countries to ‘ground the global agenda in their national realities and development priorities’ 
(UNDP 2017: 37).
Subsequently, there is a need for harmonization of data collection methodologies across the 
world, along with the necessity of including ‘youth, refugees and other vulnerable groups’ in data 
collection (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 5). There are three specific challenges that NSOs need to 
overcome: independence ‘to uphold the impartiality of statistics,’ ‘budgetary constraints,’ and the 
use of ‘robust, inclusive methodologies that meet international standards’ (SDG-16 Conference 
2019: 7). Especially on corruption, there is a ‘need for a sound, clear and universal definition 
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of corruption for analytical purposes, and for adopting methodologies that are sensitive to con-
texts’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 8). As demonstrated by this section, despite its controversies, 
SDG-16 is ‘key to achieving the transformative 2030 Agenda,’ since it highlights ‘seven tenets of 
strong institutions (effective, inclusive, responsive, participative, representative, accountable and 




As illustrated by the overview of the peace/security and development nexus and the content and 
controversies of SDG-16 sections above, the interconnectedness of security and development has 
been repeatedly acknowledged by the international community, especially since the end of the 
Cold War. Despite that, the international community had ‘a deeply ambivalent attitude’ towards 
dealing with complex intra-state conflicts, democratization processes, the economic viability of 
conflict-torn states, and the presence of organized crime networks (Wolff & Dursun-Özkanca 
2012: 297). This ambivalence is substantiated by the incomplete track record of the international 
community on achieving peace, security, and development. 
Three years after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, Pathways for Peace, a joint UN-WB study, 
highlighted both the role played by grievances in causing conflict and the importance of conflict 
prevention (UN & WB 2018). It called for prevention efforts to be sustained over time to ‘address 
structural issues comprehensively, strengthen institutions, and adapt incentives for actions to 
manage conflict without violence’ (UN & WB 2018: xxv). It also recommended prevention to be 
inclusive and to build broad partnerships across groups ‘to identify and address grievances that 
fuel violence’ and to ‘target patterns of exclusion and institutional weaknesses that increase risk’ 
(UN & WB 2018: xxv). According to the latest IEP report, ‘the level of global peacefulness dete-
riorated’ for the ninth time in the past 12 years, and violence has a cost of $14.5 trillion annually, 
which is equivalent to 10.6% of the world’s economic activity (IEP 2020: 3). Furthermore, by 2030, 
over 60% of the world’s poor will be living in countries affected by high levels of violence (OECD 
2015; UN and WB 2018). 
As discussed earlier, even though there are significant tendencies among technocrats for com-
partmentalizing the security and development realms, contemporary security problems and 
development challenges do not occur in isolation. They feed off of each other. Good governance 
of the security and justice sector is key to sustainable development (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR & 
UN Women 2019). Integrated and multidimensional responses to development challenges, espe-
cially in contexts that are associated with conditions of fragility and violent conflict, tackling the 
challenging and long-term reforms early on, and reconceptualizing transitions to develop a more 
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nuanced understanding of the type of transition a country is undergoing emerge as central to 
SDGs and Agenda 2030 (UNDP & Oxford Policy Management 2019: 6).
It is therefore of crucial importance that the international community simultaneously address 
issues of peace and security and development, as there are ‘transnational challenges – terrorism, 
crime, and societal resiliency – that poison the  well for economic development’ (Bergenas & 
Mahoney 2016). Nevertheless, there is a gap in the literature linking development and security 
through a conceptual framework connecting SDG-16 with SSG/R, especially when it comes to 
oversight, accountability, and local ownership in SSR. SSG/R place emphasis on the concepts 
of oversight of armed forces and police forces, highlight accountability, transparency, and empow-
erment of people in the decision-making processes when it comes to reforming the armed forces 
and police units. In that sense, SSG/R is well-equipped to contribute to majority of the targets 
of SDG-16. Nevertheless, SSR-related targets are a subset of the targets under SDG-16. Conse-
quently, the issues that are under the purview of SDG-16 require an in-depth analysis of the nexus 
between security and development, specifically connecting SDG-16 to SSG/R.
This topic is especially pertinent at this point in time, as the COVID-19 pandemic imposed 
additional problems for both peace/security and economic development and underscored the 
fundamental importance of human security. There are serious concerns with regards to reversed 
gains on economic development, social progress, and environmental sustainability made prior 
to the pandemic (#SDG16Plus 2020; Barbier & Burgess 2020). The pandemic devastated most 
economies around the world. The lockdown measures ‘have ruptured the traditional arteries for 
foreign direct investment… with supply chains upended and trade volumes crashing’ (The Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit 2020: 1). As stated by The Economist Intelligence Unit (2020: 1), ‘Hospi-
tality, tourism, retail, entertainment and transport (particularly airlines) have all suffered from 
sharp falls in demand,’ and ‘electricity consumption – a broad measure of economic activity’ and 
oil demand has dropped drastically. It is estimated that the pandemic could cost the world more 
than US$10 trillion (Vos, Martin & Laborde 2020), and it had a particularly adverse effect on the 
developing countries in Africa and South Asia (Ahmed et al. 2020; Sumner, Ortiz-Juarez & Hoy 
2020). To illustrate, it is expected that up to 400 million new poor are expected to live in extreme 
poverty, and over 500 million new poor expected to live under US$3.20 and US$5.50 (Sumner, 
Ortiz-Juarez & Hoy 2020). As reaffirmed in the latest High-Level Political Forum on Sustain-
able Development (HLPF) in July 2020, the pandemic ‘is expected to push tens of millions of 
people back into extreme poverty and hunger’ (ECOSOC 2020: 3). 
Besides its harmful impact on economic development, the pandemic is also expected to have 
negative repercussions on peace and security. The pandemic is expected to have a negative impact 
on peace due to ‘a new wave of tension and uncertainty’ (IEP 2020: 2). The economic repercus-
sions of the pandemic ‘will likely have a severe impact on the way societies function,’ leading to 
declining positive peace and increasing the risk of outbreaks of violence and conflict’ (IEP 2020: 3). 
The pandemic is expected to increase the likelihood of conflicts around the world, as civil unrest 
in Europe is expected to rise ‘as the looming recession bites’ (IEP 2020: 3). Moreover, countries 
around the world may engage in a blame game, blaming others for the challenges they face (Leal 
Filho 2020), and ‘famine conditions,’ may create ‘further stress on many fragile countries’ in Africa 
(IEP 2020: 3). Furthermore, in response to COVID-19, several governments introduced laws that 
impinge on basic freedoms of their citizens. As the IEP (2020: 7) reports, ‘The Safety and Security 
domain deteriorated on average, with 89 countries deteriorating and 70 improving.’ There is a 
growing trend towards authoritarianism around the world, as reflected in deterioration in several 
indicators, such as ‘political terror scale, police rate, and incarceration rate’ (IEP 2020: 7). There 
are growing numbers of violent demonstrations and social unrest around the world, such as in 
Chile and Hong Kong, and ‘the possibility of future violence remains high’ (IEP 2020: 7). 
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Gender equality is key for the attainment of SDG-16 (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women 
2019). Nevertheless, there are ‘risks of regression in gender equality’ (ECOSOC 2020: 3) due to 
the ‘multi-faceted impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women and girls, who … face increased 
levels of violence and exploitation’ (ECOSOC 2020: 4). As stated by the HLPF 2020, there are deep 
concerns ‘about the impact of high debt levels on countries’ ability to withstand the impact of the 
COVID-19 shock and to invest in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda’ (ECOSOC 2020: 7).
It is, therefore, safe to argue that the COVID-19 pandemic has convoluted and exacerbated 
the already-complex and multidimensional problems that the international community has been 
facing in accomplishing the SDGs. It created an unprecedented scale of threats to people’s health, 
livelihood, dignity, which helped make it clear that health, economic, political, food, environmen-
tal, and community security are all deeply intertwined. This paper, therefore, seeks to fill the gap 
in the literature by incorporating the human security approach into the conceptual framework 
on the nexus between SSG/R and SDG-16. It holds that the latest developments bolster the value 
of the concept of human security in weaving closer connections between SSG/R and SDG-16.

CHAPTER 5
Conceptual Framework: SSG/R and SDG-16 Nexus
a. Commonalities between SSG/R and SDG-16
SDG-16 is intrinsically related to SSR, which seeks to ensure the safety of citizens to live their daily 
lives free from fear of attacks, criminal assault, or other forms of violence (UN 2018). In that sense, 
both focus on negative peace measures. SDG-16 also particularly seeks to change the culture as 
well as implement institutional reforms (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 9), which are central aspects 
to the SSR missions. As such, they both aim at establishing positive peace too. SDG-16 targets seek 
to improve institutions of the justice system, policymaking, and law enforcement. In that sense, 
SDG-16 and SSR share the same focus on the ‘police, prosecutors, judges, prison system and min-
istries that deal with justice and policing’ (TAP Network 2016: 15). SDG-16 highlights the need 
for having good SSG (Myrttinen 2019). They both focus on improving governance within national 
states. As illustrated by Table 2 below, promotion of the rule of law and equal access to justice 
(Target 16.3), the return of stolen assets, the reduction of arms flows, and fight against organized 
crime (Target 16.4), reduction of corruption (Target 16.5), accountability and transparency (Target 
16.6), responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision making (Target 16.7), and 
strengthening of relevant national institutions for building capacity at all levels to prevent vio-
lence and combat terrorism and crime (Target 16.a) are among the many goals shared between 
SSG/R and SDG-16. There is an especially strong connection between Targets 16.3, 16.6, 16.7, 
16.10, 16.a, and 16.b and SSG/R. Here, it is possible to identify a number of thematic issues that 
connect SSG/R with SDG-16, such as inclusivity, context specificity, and governance and institu-
tionalization concepts of transparency, democratic oversight, accountability, legitimacy, and the 
rule of law. 
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Table 2: SSG/R and SDG-16 Commonalities.
SSG/R Thematic Concepts





Accountability Legitimacy The Rule 
of Law
Target 16.1 √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.2 √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.3 √ √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.4 √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.5 √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.6 √ √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.7 √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.8 √ √ √
Target 16.9 √ √ √ √
Target 16.10 √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.a √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Target 16.b √ √ √ √ √ √
i. Inclusivity
Inclusivity, which lies at the heart of SDG-16, is also key to the success of SSR and an important 
principle of SSG, as demonstrated by a relatively recent emphasis allocated to local ownership 
in the SSG/R literature. To have a successful outcome in both SSR and SSG, the participative 
approach is of the highest importance so that all the relevant stakeholders are involved in the 
reforms of the security sector and for accountability. Furthermore, illustrating the importance of 
inclusivity, Agenda 2030 emphasizes that the SDGs aim to leave ‘no one behind’ (UNGA 2015: 3). 
Regarding inclusivity, ‘who is included (elites versus broader society); and around what (for 
instance, processes of decision-making versus outcomes),’ emerge as important questions (Rocha 
Menocal 2015, italics in original). There is a sizable literature on the importance of inclusivity 
and the impact of exclusion and injustice on cultivating violent conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; 
Cramer 2003; Donais & McCandless 2016; Evans 2012; Paffenholz 2014; Rocha Menocal 2015). 
Inclusivity is encapsulated in numerous SDG-16 targets. Target 16.6 is directly related to effec-
tiveness, accountability, and transparency, which are similarly emphasized in SSR, along with 
democratic oversight and assessment. To have public trust and legitimacy, it is of key importance 
that the different segments of the society feel included in the way public services, especially secu-
rity infrastructure, are organized. Legitimacy is defined by OECD-DAC (2010: 7) as ‘the extent 
that people regard [a political order, institution or actor] as satisfactory and believe that no avail-
able alternative would be vastly superior.’ It is especially important for targets and indicators 16.2, 
‘End abuse, exploitations, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children,’ 
and 16.6.2, ‘Percentage of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services’ 
(UN Statistics Division 2016: 11). Every member of society needs to feel safe when it comes to 
trusting that the security sector will seek the best interest of all people in the society, such as chil-
dren, as well as minorities and women. In that sense, Indicator 16.6.2 is closely related to Target 
10.2 (social inclusion) (UN Statistics Division 2016: 23). These goals and targets support the con-
cepts of accountability, legitimacy, local ownership, and democratic oversight that lie at the heart 
of SSG/R. 
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Moreover, Indicator 16.2.3 ‘Proportion of young women and men aged 18–29 years who expe-
rienced sexual violence by age 18’ also emphasizes the inclusion of youth in protection against 
sexual violence. Inclusion is also highlighted by Target 16.7 ‘Ensure responsive, inclusive, partici-
patory and representative decision-making at all levels’ (UN Statistics Division 2016: 26). Repre-
sentation and participation of all groups of the society in decision making is emphasized by this 
particular target. As noted by the UN Statistics Division (2016: 26), ‘Fairer representation of all 
population groups in public service positions at all levels renders decision-making by public bod-
ies more legitimate and more responsive to the concerns of the whole population.’ Here, besides 
objective measures, perception-related subjective measures become similarly important in assess-
ing the SDG-16.7. As noted by the UN Statistics Division (2016: 27), ‘In cases where a group is 
very under-represented or has experienced historical discrimination, temporary special measures 
including minimum quotas on representation may be introduced to redress such discrimination.’ 
This further supports the context-specific nature of Target 16.7.
Target 16.7 focuses on having inclusive, participatory, and representative decision making at all 
levels of public bodies. It is in line with the principles of good governance that are emphasized by 
the SSG. This target is of particular importance for a successful implementation of inclusivity in 
effective SSR, as it ensures a fairer representation of different population groups in these institu-
tions and contributes to increased legitimacy and responsiveness to the concerns of all people in 
the population. For SSG/R purposes, special attention has to be paid to inclusion, participation, 
and representation of different groups of people in the judiciary, police, and military. Ensuring 
local ownership in SSR missions would positively contribute to the implementation of Target 16.7.
Inclusivity is once again pronounced by Target 16.9, ‘By 2030, provide legal identity for all, 
including birth registration.’ If people lack a legal identity, it is not procedurally feasible to envi-
sion their inclusion in any public debate or institution. Therefore, Target 16.9 is of key impor-
tance for the implementation of the principle of inclusivity. As noted by the UN Statistics Division 
(2016: 31), registration for legal identity is ‘the first step in securing their recognition before the 
law, safeguarding … rights, and ensuring that any violation of these rights does not go unnoticed.’ 
Secondly, it enables governments to ‘effectively plan and budget for basic services’ (TAP Network 
2016: 11).
Another instance in which inclusivity is pronounced is through Target 16.a – ‘Strengthen rele-
vant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all 
levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime’ 
(UN Statistics Division 2016: 43). On 20 December 1993, the UN General Assembly Resolution 
48/134 on ‘National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,’ adopted an 
annex outlining ‘the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions,’ also known as the 
Paris Principles (Council of Europe 2018). The Paris Principles called for the creation of independ-
ent national human rights institutions (NHRIs) by all UN member states. NHRIs are designed to 
be ‘non-judicial, independent institutions created by states through their constitution or law, with 
the mandate to promote and protect human rights’ (Council of Europe 2018). 
The Paris Principles still leave a significant amount of leeway for the UN member states to 
decide the type of NHRI to best serve their domestic purposes. As noted by the Council of Europe 
(2018), ‘In Europe, the most common models are ombudsman institutions, human rights com-
missions, hybrid institutions (which combine several mandates, including that of equality body), 
and human rights institutes and centres.’ The Paris Principles set the benchmarks for the integrity, 
impartiality, and effectiveness of NHRIs in dealing with all human rights. An important compo-
nent of The Paris Principles revolves around the concept of inclusion of national and international 
stakeholders, transparency, and accountability (the Council of Europe 2018). NHRIs ‘operate and 
function independently from government’ and ‘address discrimination in all its forms, as well 
as to promote the protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights’ (UN Statis-
tics Division 2016: 43). Effective NHRIs provide a link between government and civil society 
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organizations and address the ‘protection gap’ between individual rights and government 
responsibilities (UN Statistics Division 2016: 43). NHRIs play a key role in ‘monitoring, ensur-
ing inclusion and participation, as well as in the domain of access to justice … bridg[ing] the 
link between sustainable development and human rights’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 9).
Finally, Target 16.b too emphasizes inclusivity. This is clearly highlighted by its title ‘Promote 
and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development,’ highlighting non-
discrimination. This target emphasizes that non-discrimination and sustainable development go 
hand in hand with one another and is related to SDG Targets 10.2, 10.3, and 16.3.
ii. Context specificity
Besides inclusion, context specificity is another commonality between SSR and SDG-16. The fea-
tures of the local environment are crucial for the success of both SSR and the attainment of the 
targets of SDG-16. Even though the universality principle is emphasized by both SSG and SDGs, 
it does not mean that specific context-related factors are going to be irrelevant to the implementa-
tion of SSG/R and SDG-16. In fact, in assessing the progress made on Target 16.1, ‘Significantly 
reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere,’ there is a consensus on the need 
to classify the deaths from violence between intentional homicide and conflict-related deaths. 
Especially for conflict-related deaths, not all countries around the world experience conflict. 
Therefore, context specificity becomes important for determining ‘the scope of these threats,’ and 
effectively mitigating the dangers caused by them (UN Statistics Division 2016: 9). 
Context specificity is once again highlighted by Target 16.7, ‘Ensure responsive, inclusive, par-
ticipatory and representative decision-making at all levels.’ To illustrate, each country has a dif-
ferent track record of different groups of people that are under-represented in decision making. 
By using context specificity, the international community can more effectively and efficiently 
determine the target groups, such as people with disabilities, members of different ethnic groups, 
LGBTQ communities, religious groups, and linguistic groups. 
Target 16.10 also emphasizes context specificity in the context of ensuring public access to infor-
mation for the protection of fundamental freedoms. It acknowledges the role played by national 
legislation. Therefore, in order to take the necessary measures against deficiencies, it is important 
to determine each country’s track record on access to information, fundamental rights imple-
mentation, and human rights violations committed especially against journalists, human rights 
defenders, and trade unionists (UN Statistics Division 2016).
iii. Governance and institutionalization
Aside from inclusivity and context specificity, governance and institutionalization have been simi-
larly emphasized by SSG/R and SDG-16. Creation and strengthening of institutions are important 
elements for governing better. As illustrated below, they can be achieved through transparency, 
democratic oversight, accountability, legitimacy, and the rule of law.
1. Transparency, democratic oversight, accountability, and legitimacy
One important principle of good governance is transparency, which is similarly emphasized by 
both SSG/R and SDG-16. For instance, Targets 16.6 and 16.10 are directly related to the concept 
of transparency. Target 16.6 is titled, ‘Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions 
at all levels.’ Target 16.10, ‘Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, 
in accordance with national legislation and international agreements,’ is directly related to the 
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principle of transparency. These two targets are related to public trust in institutions, an impor-
tant aspect of successful SSR implementation. Transparency is one of the main principles of SSG 
(DCAF 2015). It is defined as information being ‘freely available and accessible to those who will 
be affected by decisions and their implementation’ (DCAF 2015: 3).
Democratic oversight is a ‘precondition for accountability’ (Gill 2020: 4). Accountability, 
another important principle of SSG, is vital for healing the ‘wounds of past abuses’ and in estab-
lishing enduring peace (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 7). It ‘means that people will be held respon-
sible for their actions and for how they perform their duties’ (The Centre for Integrity in the 
Defence Sector (CIDS) 2014: 8). It is typically guaranteed by the effective implementation of 
the rule of law. As explained in greater detail in the final section of this manuscript, oversight and 
accountability have important implications for the legitimacy of the security sector in the eyes of 
the people and are equally emphasized by SDG-16. Transparency, oversight, and accountability 
enhance perceptions of public security and add to legitimacy of the police (Hryniewicz 2011). As 
indicated in Table 2, Targets 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.10, 16.a, and 16.b are directly related to 
transparency, democratic oversight, accountability, and legitimacy.
2. The rule of law
Final commonalities between SSG/R and SDG-16 include the goals of enforcing the rule of law 
and further institutionalization. For instance, reduction of violence (Target 16.1), ending abuse, 
exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children (Target 16.2), pro-
motion of the rule of law at the national and international levels, and equal access to justice for all 
(Target 16.3), as well as reduction of small arms and combatting against organized crime (Target 
16.4) and corruption (Target 16.5) are all shared between SSG/R and SDG-16, and revolve around 
the concept of the rule of law. It is well-established that ‘access to justice empowers the poor and 
marginalized to claim their rights’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 6). Therefore, the ‘provision of free 
legal aid services to all’ emerges as an important agenda item, as do alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 15). Ensuring institutional integrity, transparency, 
anti-corruption mechanisms, facilitation of investigations of criminal activities, corruption, and 
money laundering is important for SSG/R as well as for SDG-16. Similarly, as noted by OECD-
DAC (2007: 5), ‘control over the production, export, import and transit of small arms and light 
weapons, [and] the development of institutional structures for policy guidance, research and 
monitoring’ are within the purview of SSR due to their implications on the rule of law. 
Institutionalization, which is emphasized in Target 16.a, ‘Strengthen relevant national institu-
tions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular 
in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime,’ is directly related to 
the SSG/R’s core mission. It is similarly emphasized by both Target 16.6, which seeks to ‘develop 
effective, accountable and transparent institutions,’ and Target 16.8 on global institutions. Finally, 
the effectiveness of inter-institutional cooperation and coordination is expected to determine the 
success of the outcomes in both SSR and SDG-16. Multi-stakeholder and ‘whole-of-government’ 
approaches are key to both SSG/R and SDG-16 (OECD-DAC 2007: 11).
b. Differences between SSG/R and SDG-16
While there are many commonalities between SSG/R and SDG-16, there are also a few differences 
between the two, especially in terms of the emphasis given to certain concepts. One of the major 
differences between SSR and SDG-16 is that the SDGs, including SDG-16, are universal in focus, 
whereas SSR has been primarily focusing on developing and post-conflict countries, typically 
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ignoring the developed parts of the world. SSG, on the other hand, seeks to reaffirm the principles 
of good governance in the management of the security sector universally. 
Secondly, the focus on combatting organized crime and reducing illicit financial and arms flows 
is more prevalent in SDG-16 than it is in SSG/R. While SSG/R focus on transparency and the 
rule of law, they do not directly tackle the issues of organized crime and illicit financial and arms 
flows, except for the cases of DDR conducted in post-conflict contexts, which seeks to rehabilitate 
former combatants and involve initiatives pertaining to small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
(Wulf 2011: 340). Therefore, Target 16.4, ‘By 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms 
flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime,’ 
does not fully fall under the direct purview of SSG/R. Having said that, if conducted properly and 
applied in a local context in the West and Global South, SSG/R would ensure that organized crime 
and illicit financial and arms flow problems are under control. Otherwise, SALW initiatives and 
DDR provide somewhat of an ancillary link between SSR and Target 16.4.
Thirdly, Target 16.8 is another difference between SDG-16 and SSR. Even though Target 16.8 
places a special role on inclusivity, it does so at the global level. Target 16.8 is defined as ‘Broaden 
and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance’ 
(UN Statistics Division 2016: 29). In other words, whereas Target 16.7 focuses at the local level 
in each member state of the UN, Target 16.8 assesses whether different countries are represented in 
international organizations with a global mandate, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Prepara-
tory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (UN Statistics Division 2016). It emphasizes 
the importance of participation of all countries in the global financial-economic structures and the 
rules-based system. SSR, on the other hand, can be more developed-country initiated and may 
be more in line with the security interests of Western governments, whereas SDG-16 seeks to 
empower the developing countries more. This does not mean to suggest that SSG/R are against 
participation of developing countries in the global governance structures, but it simply indicates 
that this issue does not receive priority in SSG/R planning. 
Fourthly, Target 16.9, ‘By 2030 provide legal identity for all including free birth registrations,’ 
is not under the purview of SSR. While provision of legal identity for all would be a preliminary 
requirement for a successful justice reform and contribute to the overall rule of law in a country, 
it is not directly related to the SSR mission. Having said that, it is important to acknowledge that 
provision of legal identity would be essential in making sure that people’s rights and freedoms are 
protected by the actors of the security sector. For instance, ‘Many children have no legal identity, 
which is a risk factor for trafficking or exclusion from public services’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 7). 
Since it is a precondition for ensuring an equal implementation of the rule of law, it is still some-
what related to SSG/R. 
Moreover, Target 16.10, ‘Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental free-
doms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements,’ is in line with the 
concepts of accountability and transparency, which are important principles of good governance 
cherished by SSG/R. However, it is possible to make the argument that the way this target is 
framed in SDG-16 is more closely in line with the concept of human security than with SSG/R, 
because it limits itself to the access of information with regards to the security and justice sectors 
and has a broader focus on fundamental freedoms. As reported in previous empirical studies, 
when it comes to implementation, SSR missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Georgia, and the 
Palestinian Territories prioritized the state rather than the people (Bouris 2012; Dursun-Özkanca 
& Vandemoortele 2014; Kunz & Valasek 2012; Simons 2012). Target 16.10’s emphasis is there-
fore more directly aligned with human security’s emphasis on transparency, empowerment of the 
people, and accountability.
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Nonetheless, Target 16.10 still aligns well with the main principles of SSG/R, due to its emphasis 
on the concepts of accountability and transparency. In fact, during the first phase of a post-conflict 
SSR process, enacting laws that ensure guaranteed access to information is a priority. During the 
more advanced phases of the SSR, developing the civilian capacity further through parliamentary 
oversight, civil society, freedom of the media, and creation of epistemic communities to exercise 
formal and informal oversight powers become priorities. Without a successful first phase of SSR, 
countries may not achieve successful implementation of further SSG/R. For instance, research on 
Indonesian and Nigerian parliaments as political actors and arenas of military reform revealed 
that important political battles of the reform process have been waged for passing laws that ensure 
guaranteed access to information. However, when this was not successful, further progress for 
SSR was hampered (Rüland et al. 2012). Given that the state is the only entity that can guarantee 
the implementation of human rights principles, such as freedom of access to information, SSG/R, 
if successfully implemented, can substantially contribute to the attainment of Target 16.10, espe-
cially with regards to access to security-related information. 
Target 16.b, ‘Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable devel-
opment,’ is not directly related to the SSR mission, even though the rule of law and non-discrimi-
nation are important foundational principles in SSG. While non-discriminatory laws and policies 
are prioritized, there is no direct reference to sustainable development in typical SSR missions. As 
explained in the subsequent section, this target aligns especially well with the concept of human 
security’s freedom from fear, as it would eliminate discrimination in the legal system based on 
race, sex, gender, religion, and ethnicity, and freedom from want, and it would promote sustain-
able development. 
Furthermore, even though some emphasize SSR’s people-centered nature (Schnabel & Farr 
2012), comparatively speaking, putting people first is more emphasized in SDG-16 than in SSG/R, 
where the focus is primarily on the institutions of the state. Having said that, as noted in the 
previous section, institutionalization plays an important role in both SSG/R and SDG-16. This is 
evident in the SDG-16’s main emphasis on building ‘effective, accountable and inclusive institu-
tions at all levels.’ SSR practice tends to focus more on national security rather than human secu-
rity. It is mainly top-down rather than bottom-up. The main goal in SSR is institution building. 
Institutions, by nature and design, are maintained by the states. As criticized by many scholars 
of SSR, SSR is ‘state-centric’ both with regards to its definition of security and the providers of 
security (Bouris 2012; Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2014; Kunz & Valasek 2012; Simons 
2012). SSR activities should not aim ‘to secure the state at the expense of the people’ and instead 
should emphasize the need to protect human security (Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2014: 
149). ‘Due to state-centrism, most SSR funding from international donors has gone to “reforming” 
formal state security institutions, such as the police and armed forces,’ while ignoring oversight 
bodies and non-state security and justice providers (Kunz & Valasek 2012: 125).
Finally, whereas SDG-16 emphasizes longer-term goals, SSR programming may suffer from 
short-sighted thinking due to donor interests. Another fundamental difference between SDG-16 
and SSG/R is the emphasis placed on public perceptions of safety. While perceptions of security 
play a significant role in SDG-16, they do not play much of a role in SSR. As illustrated by the next 
section, with regards to many of these differences between SDG-16 and SSG/R, human security 
is fittingly situated to better align SSG/R with SDG-16 and its targets. While SSG/R and SDG-16 
share and emphasis on peace, security, institution-building as well as justice and human rights, 




How to Better Tie SSG/R and SDG-16 Together 
This section introduces the concept of human security as a way to better tie SSG/R and SDG-16 
and discusses how the concept has evolved over time. Human security places a key emphasis on 
the security-development nexus (Steiner 2019), arguably more so than SSR. It holds that ‘sustain-
able development and sustaining peace are two sides of the same coin’ (Steiner 2019). It maintains, 
‘the safety and economic well-being (freedom from fear and freedom from want) are key ingredi-
ents of a stable society with a promising future’ (Schnabel 2012: 31). In that sense, as demonstrated 
below, human security provides a helpful bridge between SDG-16 and SSG/R. 
a. Human security: An introduction
The concept of human security has emerged from the UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report, 
titled New Dimensions of Human Security, and has evolved over time. Human development seeks 
to enhance the lives of humans, which makes the emphasis on human security central (The Com-
mission on Human Security 2003). Human security is typically defined as freedom from fear and 
freedom from want, as it emphasizes ‘first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease 
and repression,’ and ‘second, … protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities’ (UNDP 1994: 23). 
The concept of human security not only emphasizes the security of the individual, but also 
highlights the importance of development. It ‘puts people at the centre of development,’ ‘regards 
economic growth as a means not an end,’ and places an emphasis on sustainable development by 
protecting ‘the life opportunities of future generations as well as the present generations’ (UNDP 
1994: 4). Referring to the notion of ‘peace dividends,’ UNDP (1994: 58) suggests that human 
security contains seven components: economic, food, health, environment, personal, commu-
nity, and political security. Thus, it proposes a more comprehensive assessment of the well-being 
of the people by expanding the focus on security to include threats to human needs and well-
being, such as diseases, environmental threats, economic threats. It includes the assumption that 
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such threats ‘can trigger direct and structural violence, possibly leading to armed violence’ caus-
ing a vicious cycle (Baldassini et al. 2018: 16). Therefore, the argument it holds is that if individu-
als and communities are free from fear and want, ‘conflict can be mitigated’ (Baldassini et al. 
2018: 16). In that sense, human security represents a shift from a state-centric security approach 
(UNDP 1994). 
The 1995 Copenhagen declaration, published following the World Summit, officially embraced 
human security as a guiding concept for development work (Bueger & Vennesson 2009). Fol-
lowing a brief pause in attention to the concept, Canada introduced the concept in the UNSC at 
the end of the 1990s (Baldassini et al. 2018). In 1999, the Human Security Network (HSN) was 
established under the leadership of Austria, Norway, and Canada as a result of the anti-landmine 
movement; it seeks to promote ‘the concept of human security as a feature of national and inter-
national policies, and in particular within the United Nations and in cooperation with academia 
and civil society’ (PreventionWeb 2020). Its members include Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, 
Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Panama, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Thailand, with South Africa 
participating as an observer (PreventionWeb 2020).
Since then, human security has steadily acquired attention from the international community. 
It is one of the prime examples of ‘epistemic learning,’ or the emergence of a consensus among 
policymakers on a novel way to respond to security challenges (Faleg 2012: 161). The Commis-
sion on Human Security was launched at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. In 2001, the OECD 
acknowledged the central role of human security in security-development nexus (Baldassini et al. 
2018). The Commission aims to empower and protect people, and ‘focus on what can be done 
in the short and the long run to enhance the opportunities for eliminating insecurities across 
the world’ (The Commission on Human Security 2003: iv). In September 2002, under the initia-
tive of Japan, the Commission on Human Security created more momentum behind the concept 
internationally (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights 2020). A year later, the Commission 
on Human Security published its widely cited Human Security Now report (The Commission on 
Human Security 2003). 
The Human Security Now report emphasizes that ‘the broad range of interconnected issues,’ 
such as conflict and poverty, require human security’s involvement to protect ‘people during vio-
lent conflict and in post-conflict situations,’ to defend ‘people who are forced to move,’ to over-
come ‘economic insecurities,’ to guarantee ‘the availability of essential healthcare,’ and to ensure 
‘the elimination of illiteracy and educational deprivation’ (The Commission on Human Security 
2003: iv). Regarding human security’s emphasis on protection and empowerment, the Commis-
sion on Human Security (2003: 10) notes that ‘protection strategies’ are set up by various state and 
non-state actors to ‘shield people from menaces,’ whereas ‘empowerment strategies enable people 
to develop resilience to difficult conditions.’ Human security creates ‘political, social, environ-
mental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of 
survival, livelihood and dignity’ (The Commission on Human Security 2003: 4). The latest panel 
held by the UNTFHS in June 2020 confirms this by noting that the goal of human security is to 
‘break through silos that constrain or prevent the type of integrated thinking necessary to address 
the scope and scale of today’s human insecurities’ (UNTFHS 2020). 
Human security was referenced as a core principle for UN activities in the Report of the UN 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UNGA 2004), following the attempts by the 
2000 and 2005 Reports of then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan We the People and In Larger 
Freedom ‘to institutionalize human security’ (Bueger & Vennesson 2009: 18). The Report of the UN 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UNGA 2004: 15), for instance, acknowledges 
that the UN founders were predominantly preoccupied with state security when they created the 
organization, but adds that ‘they also understood well … the indivisibility of security, economic 
development and human freedom.’ 
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The UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 (UNGA 2012: 1) defines human security as ‘an 
approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting 
challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and outlines the following com-
ponents of human security that are indicated in Table 3.
Table 3: Human Security Components.
(a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in 
particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal 
opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential; 
(b) Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented 
responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities; 
(c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and 
equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights; 
(d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation; 
(e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human security 
does not replace State security; 
(f) Human security is based on national ownership. Since the political, economic, social and cultural 
conditions for human security vary significantly across and within countries, and at different points in 
time, human security strengthens national solutions which are compatible with local realities; 
(g) Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and 
dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide the 
necessary support to Governments, upon their request, so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to 
current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among 
Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society; 
(h) Human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations, including full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity 
and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Human 
security does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States.
Source: UNGA (2012: 1–2).
All in all, human security emphasizes both protection and empowerment, pays special atten-
tion to the most vulnerable, and recognizes that problems rarely occur in isolation and that they 
are almost always interdependent (Stern & Öjendal 2010). It acknowledges that there are no 
one-size-fits-all solutions to problems around the world. As the next section illustrates, due to its 
scope, human security has a great potential to serve as a linkage between SSR/SSG and SDG-16. 
b. Human security as a linkage between SSG/R and SDG-16
Reduction of violence is a shared goal between SSR, human security, and SDG-16. Promotion 
of the rule of law, access to justice, institutional reform, and combatting corruption goals are 
similarly shared between the three. Human security focuses on the ‘insecurities that threaten 
human survival or the safety of daily life, or imperil the natural dignity of men and women, or 
expose human beings to the uncertainty of disease and pestilence, or subject vulnerable people 
to abrupt penury related to economic downturns’ (The Commission on Human Security 2003: 
8). As noted by the Commission on Human Security (2003: 8), human security ‘supplements the 
expansionist perspective of human development by directly paying attention to what are some-
times called “downside risks.”’ Reflecting on the relationship between human security and human 
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development, the Commission on Human Security (2003: 8) notes that while there are no contra-
dictions between human security and human development, ‘the emphasis and priorities are quite 
different in the cautious perspective of human security from those typically found in the relatively 
sanguine and upward-oriented literature of the human focus of development approaches.’ The 
Commission maintains that the focus on human security calls for attention to be paid to ‘down-
turns with security’ and ‘the adversity of persistent insecurity of those whom the growth process 
leaves behind, such as the displaced worker or the perennially unemployed’ (The Commission on 
Human Security 2003: 8).
A careful examination of The Agenda 2030 reveals that it closely incorporates important ele-
ments of the human security concept. For instance, it emphasizes that the SDGs have a universal 
focus, and they aim to leave ‘no one behind’ (UNGA 2015: 3). Human security’s people-centered 
approach, summarized in its mantra of ‘leave no one behind,’ is a good starting point for bridg-
ing between SDG-16 and SSG/R. It is ‘an essential tool to realize the core ambition of the 2030 
Agenda’ (Steiner 2019). ‘Leave no one behind’ is also becoming the mantra of the SDGs. Agenda 
2030 declares, ‘As we embark on this great collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left 
behind’ (UNGA 2015: 3). It also adds, ‘Recognizing that the dignity of the human person is fun-
damental, we wish to see the Goals and targets met for all nations and peoples and for all segments 
of society’ (UNGA 2015: 3). 
Through its emphasis on empowerment, two targets that human security would effectively sup-
port are Target 16.8, ‘Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the 
institutions of global governance,’ and Target 16.10, ‘Ensure public access to information and pro-
tect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.’ 
The UN and WB (2018: xxvii) emphasize the importance of ‘a people-centered approach,’ ‘main-
streaming citizen engagement in development programs and local conflict resolution to empower 
underrepresented groups such as women and youth’ in achieving SDG-16. While both SDG-16 
and human security hold the ‘people-centered’ approach and ‘leave no one behind’ principle dear 
to their heart, the SSG/R literature does not pay direct attention to these elements. 
Furthermore, the SDGs have a complex implementation process, involving ‘national ownership, 
flexibility, innovation, political acumen, high quality technical support and a collective, multi-
stakeholder effort at all levels’ (The Global Alliance 2019: 20). While these principles are similarly 
shared by SSR and SSG on paper, through its multi-stakeholder and multidimensional approach 
and emphasis on ‘leaving no one behind,’ human security would offer value-added solutions when 
it comes to ensuring that SSG/R more effectively contributes to SDG-16 targets. 
A key factor that determines whether SSR and SDG-16 will be successful or not is effective 
inter-institutional cooperation and coordination. As suggested by the UN and WB (2018: xxvi), 
‘A coherent strategy that can be sustained over time demands levels of integrated planning and 
implementation that are often challenging to development, security, humanitarian, and political 
actors.’ Hence, having a ‘sustained, inclusive, and targeted prevention’ coordinated effectively by 
these actors is critical (UN & WB 2018: xxvi). Human security’s emphasis on inclusivity, preven-
tion, and multi-stakeholder and comprehensive approach would aptly serve the goal of imple-
menting SDG-16 targets. This is especially true for Target 16.a, as it focuses on strengthening 
national institutions through international cooperation for capacity building on prevention of 
violence and counterterrorism. 
Nevertheless, some scholars are concerned that ‘greater policy coherence and harmonisation 
among donors may lead to the subordination of development concerns to those of security and 
that ODA may thus be instrumentalised by donors to serve their geostrategic interests’ (Tschirgi 
2005, quoted in Thede 2013: 793). Tschirgi (2005: 12), for instance, notes that ‘policy coherence is 
still at a high level of abstraction’ and adds that conflict sensitivity has not been mainstreamed into 
development assistance. Another group of critical scholars attracts attention to the contradictions 
between ‘the aid effectiveness agenda and the new emphasis on security in development’ (Brown 
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2011, quoted in Thede 2013: 794; Fukuda-Parr 2010). Thede (2013: 796) argues that ‘increasing 
convergence of the content, mechanisms, criteria and delivery of official aid among donors under 
the umbrella concept of “coherence”’ leads to the subordination of development to diplomatic, 
military and trade concerns; and narrows ‘the potential space for Southern governments to opt for 
a different set of development objectives.’ Some argue that major international organizations, such 
as the WB, hold a ‘security first’ perspective for post-conflict peacebuilding processes (Krause & 
Jütersonke 2005; Schwarz 2005). Human security’s comprehensive multidimensional approach 
would help to effectively respond to such criticisms, as it emphasizes both development and secu-
rity at the same time.
The focus on local ownership is also highly essential for the success of the SSR in contributing 
to SDG-16 (Burt 2016). The incorporation of national- and local-level actors and policies in SSR 
is ‘the key to sustainability’ of SSR programming (Burt 2016: 7). Otherwise, international actors 
run the risk of failing to make progress in SSR unsustainable ‘once project funds expire’ or when 
‘national authorities that feel no ownership over the process’ abandon it (Burt 2016: 7). Therefore, 
human security’s inclusive, comprehensive, and multi-stakeholder approach would benefit SSG/R 
as well as SDG-16, helping address the gaps in SSR implementation and facilitating the accom-
plishment of SDG-16 targets more efficiently. 
The 2008 Report of the UN Secretary-General was consequential in linking the concept of SSR 
with human security (UNSG 2008). Like SSR, the human security concept ‘is a product of the 
progressive understanding and new security thinking that emerged from the end of the Cold 
War’ (Schnabel & Farr 2012: 4). The 2008 Report of the UN Secretary-General notes, ‘There 
are no quick fixes for establishing effective and accountable security institutions’ and that it is a 
‘long-term process’ to ‘build a world in which men and women can live their lives and raise their 
children in dignity, free from hunger and the fear of violence, oppression of injustice’ (UNSG 
2008: 19). It is important to acknowledge that human security cannot be achieved in the absence 
of well-functioning state structures, which is an aspect that is addressed by successful SSG/R. 
SSR’s main raison d’être is to ensure that ‘a nation’s security institutions are effective, provide 
for the safety and security of the population and the state, and are overseen and controlled by 
civil society organisations and democratically elected representatives’ (Schnabel 2012: 31). As such, 
SSG/R seek to ‘ensure that the security sector offers protection from external and internal threats 
without itself becoming a threat, resulting in an environment that is safer and less prone to violence 
and instability and thus encourages economic growth, poverty reduction and human development’ 
(Schnabel 2012: 31). Therefore, SSR’s benefits can theoretically be experienced by both security 
and development circles, as ‘safety and economic well-being are key ingredients of a stable society 
with a promising future,’ and that SSR aims to have a ‘security sector [that] offers protection from 
external and internal threats without itself becoming a threat’ (Baldassini et al. 2018: 12). 
While this is the way it is supposed to be on paper, SSR has lost touch with its development 
origins (Farr, Schnabel & Krupanski 2012). SSR was a ‘late-coming player to the old and argu-
ably overcrowded development field’ (Farr, Schnabel & Krupanski 2012: 328). The coordination 
between SSR and development implementers has been weak, leading to gaps in SSR implemen-
tation in terms of the insights derived from development goals and government development 
plans (Farr, Schnabel & Krupanski 2012: 327). The development community similarly fails to 
integrate SSR approaches in planning and design of their missions (Farr, Schnabel & Krupanski 
2012). Therefore, ‘in reality, and particularly in post-conflict societies, SSR’s security mandate has 
been more pronounced than its development mandate’ (Baldassini et al. 2018; Schnabel 2012: 31). 
As Schnabel (2012: 65) notes, SSR predominantly focuses on ‘security dividends, while develop-
ment dividends remain unspecified or vaguely defined as implicit and immeasurable outcomes of 
improved security conditions.’ 
To address these deficiencies, ‘early community-based and consultative assessments of popula-
tions’ development and security needs should be conducted jointly, so that the results can inform 
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both development and security interventions’ (Farr, Schnabel & Krupanski 2012: 327). Human 
security is positioned well to fulfil that recommendation. Human security recognizes that chal-
lenges are complex and interlinked, requiring an integrated, multidimensional, multi-stakeholder 
approach to development and complex problems. It holds that vulnerabilities must be tackled 
together by both development and security actors. While the SDGs have the same recogni-
tion (Steiner 2019), SSG/R do not emphasize the multidimensional and integrated approach as 
much, giving human security a comparative advantage for serving as a link between the SDG-16 
and SSG/R.
Human security protects and empowers people. The same is true for SSR and SDG-16. But, 
comparatively speaking, SSR focuses on a specific niche of specialized SSG and is more unidi-
mensional or security heavy than SDG-16 and human security. This does not mean to imply 
that SSR’s aims and modalities conflict with the human security paradigm. It simply means that 
the multidimensional aspect of phenomena and the development side is more pronounced in the 
case of SDG-16 and human security. Incorporating human security would, therefore, ensure that 
there is an added emphasis on achieving development and security simultaneously, and help to 
glue SSG/R and SDG-16 in a more seamless manner. 
Directly referring to freedoms from want and fear, which are heavily emphasized by the human 
security approach, Agenda 2030 declares:
In these Goals and targets, we are setting out a supremely ambitious and transformational 
vision. We envisage a world free of poverty, hunger, disease and want, where all life can 
thrive. We envisage a world free of fear and violence. A world with universal literacy. A world 
with equitable and universal access to quality education at all levels, to health care and social 
protection, where physical, mental and social well-being are assured (UNGA 2015: 3). 
Targets 16.1 and 16.2 are directly related to the concept of human security, especially freedom 
from fear, as they call for the reduction of all forms of violence everywhere and ending abuse, 
exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children, respectively. As 
noted by the UN Statistics Division (2016: 2), ‘Security from violence is a pre-requisite for indi-
viduals to enjoy a safe and active life and for societies and economies to develop freely.’ Moreover, 
SSG/R place high importance on Target 16.3, promotion of the rule of law and equal access to jus-
tice for all, and so does human security. Target 16.9, provision of legal identity for all, is important 
for a systematic application of the rule of law and for human security’s emphasis on protection 
and empowerment. 
Referring to the importance of both state-centric understanding of security and a people- 
centered understanding of it, the Report of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG 2013: 4) notes: 
The objective of security sector reform is to help ensure that people are safer through the 
enhanced effectiveness and accountability of security institutions operating under civilian 
control within a framework of the rule of law and human rights. Provision of security is 
a core function of the State. In many contexts, security institutions, such as the military 
and the police, are the most visible representatives of the State for the general public. Thus 
effective, accountable and professional security institutions can have a defining and posi-
tive impact on people’s confidence in the State. In some contexts, however, security institu-
tions are incapable of protecting populations against threats. In others, security providers 
not only fail to protect individuals and communities, they may marginalize, exclude or 
even prey on the very populations they are entrusted to protect. 
Target 16.4 aims at reducing illicit financial and arms flows, strengthening the recovery and return 
of stolen assets and combating all forms of organized crime. On this topic, the Report of the 
How to Better Tie SSG/R and SDG-16 Together  45
UN Secretary-General in 2013 emphasizes the need to incorporate a human security approach in 
SSR by stating (UNSG 2013: 5): 
[T]he security of the State and the state of security (of individuals and communities) are 
mutually interdependent; in other words, we have learned that when populations are not 
secure, neither is the State. This poses an important challenge to the typical State-centric, 
post-conflict approach to security sector reform and calls for approaches that combine 
the central role of the State with its ultimate dependence on, and linkages to, the security 
and safety of individuals and communities. Current approaches to security sector reform 
have been confronted with a proliferation of transnational threats, including trafficking in 
humans, drugs and arms; terrorism; insurgency; climate change and environmental degra-
dation; organized crime and armed violence; and cybercrime. This has led to the realiza-
tion that no single State can, on its own, meet these transborder challenges, and points to 
the need for increased cooperation across borders. 
As the UN Secretary-General’s report (UNSG 2013) emphasizes, transnational problems require 
international cooperation. Therefore, human security, through its heavy emphasis on epistemic 
communities internationally, can help address transnational threats such as organized crime net-
works and illicit financial and arms trafficking in a more effective way. For instance, the UN and 
other international organizations, non-governmental organizations, as well as the groupings of 
states under the leadership of Japan and Canada help share norms and values that are associated 
with human security. The latest UNSC Resolution adopted on SSR too ‘reiterates the importance 
of sharing experiences, best practices and lessons learned, knowledge and expertise on security 
sector reform among Members States, and regional and subregional organizations, expert institu-
tions including academia and research organizations, and relevant stakeholders including women 
and youth organisations,’ and also ‘encourages a deepening of South-South exchange and coopera-
tion’ (UNSC 2020b: 8).
With regard to Target 16.5, which seeks to reduce corruption, human security’s goals of improv-
ing the quality of life of individuals and empowerment would place an important emphasis on this 
target. Corruption has a ‘direct negative impact on the social fabric, including in the provision of 
health and education, as well as in the protection of other basic human rights’ (Tavanti & Stacho-
wicz-Stanusch 2013: 2). Similarly, anti-corruption is an important part of good governance that 
is emphasized by SSG/R. Previous studies have established the inverse correlation between cor-
ruption and human security (Durojave 2010; Hassan 2020; Tavanti & Stachowicz-Stanusch 2013). 
Human security’s collaborative, multidimensional, and multi-sectoral approach would effectively 
help address multiple dimensions of corruption, contributing to both Targets 16.5 and 16.b as well 
as SSR. Target 16.b focuses on promotion and enforcement of non-discriminatory laws and poli-
cies for sustainable development. Fight against corruption becomes important for achieving this 
target too, so does provision of legal identity, establishment of rule of law, and empowerment of 
individuals that are emphasized by human security. 
One of the key components of SDG-16 is the emphasis put on the role of perceptions, especially 
of security and insecurity. This seems to make the concept of human security more central for 
the implementation stage of the SDGs. Whereas SDG-16 takes into consideration people’s per-
ception of security/insecurity, SSG/R normally look at assessment using more objective criteria. 
Public perceptions of safety do not play much of a direct role in SSG/R. In that sense, there are 
more commonalities between SDG-16 and human security with regards to the subjective inter-
pretations of security. Human security can, therefore, serve as an important tool in fully connect-
ing SSG/R with SDG-16, by emphasizing not only the objective but also the subjective nature of 
security. The emphasis on objective as well as subjective security assessment would have positive 
repercussions for transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, concepts that are central to the 
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success of SSG/R (Dursun-Özkanca 2014). Illustrating this linkage, the Global Alliance (2019: 62) 
notes, institutions of ‘local and regional governments [which] have the responsibility for deliver-
ing basic services and public goods … can gain increased importance in situations of insecurity, 
conflict or lack of trust in national governments (or where there is no functioning central govern-
ment).’ Therefore, attributing increased emphasis on perceptions would contribute to the overall 
rule of law, peace, and justice that SDG-16 aims to accomplish. For instance, it would contribute to 
Targets 16.6 and 16.7, which seek to develop effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at 
all levels, and ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making 
at all levels, respectively. 
Finally, long-term goals are arguably more pronounced in human security, SDG-16, and SSG, 
whereas SSR efforts have the tendency to focus on short-term goals. In that sense too, human 
security is better positioned to connect SDG-16 with SSG/R and help SSR acquire a longer-term 
perspective in service of effective SSR missions and achieving the goal of implementation of SDG-
16 targets. Therefore, there are many advantages of incorporating human security in making 
tighter connections between SSG/R and SDG-16.
CHAPTER 7
Analysis
This section analyses the strengths and weaknesses of human security in accounting for the link-
ages between SSG/R and SDG-16, and then concludes by making the argument that civilian over-
sight/accountability and participative approach/local ownership are crucial for making progress 
on the SDG-16 targets. 
a. Strengths of human security as a bridge
There are numerous strengths of human security that enable it to serve as a bridge between SSG/R 
and SDG-16. Comprehensive, integrated, localized action is central for Agenda 2030, and human 
security would enable the accomplishment of these goals efficiently and effectively. Human security 
acknowledges that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions to problems. It emphasizes inclusivity, 
integrated and multidimensional attributes of response to threats to human survival, livelihood, 
and dignity (UNTFHS 2016). It would therefore significantly boost the effectiveness of SSR, 
which commonly emphasizes a more straightforward and technical approach in implementation 
(Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012). A major strength of the human security approach is 
that it focuses on ‘tangible results at the local level of society,’ which would significantly contribute 
to the attainment of the targets listed under SDG-16 (Grabek & Engwicht 2019: 2). 
Human security looks at cross-cutting issues, such as threats to human life, livelihood, and 
dignity, and emphasizes different dimensions that are directly relevant to SDG-16 and SSR. For 
instance, personal security, political security, and community security are directly related to 
SDG-16 and SSR. It entails health, economic, food, and environmental security, too, which pro-
vides a greater connection between the security and development realms. It recognizes the mul-
tidimensionality of poverty and asserts that vulnerabilities must be tackled together. As aptly put 
by UNTFHS (2016: 13):
By conceptualizing the relationship between the different components of the SDGs, the 
human security approach can frame future responses in a more interconnected and 
systematic fashion … [clarifying] how diverse issues interact and require mutually comple-
mentary solutions so as to ensure more sustainable and inclusive development.
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Human security, just like SDG-16, is universal in its focus (UNGA 2013). SSR, on the other hand, 
is predominantly focused on post-conflict situations. Human security, through its context-specific 
as well as a universal approach, has the advantage of delivering better results on the SDG-16 tar-
gets. It deems that context-specific solutions reduce inequalities and promote inclusion. These 
ingredients help bind SSR better with SSG and SDG-16. Furthermore, human security holds that 
prevention is vital to avoid the negative impact of conflict and that early action is necessary to 
build resilience against conflict. As stated by the UNGA (2013: 4):
[H]uman security initiatives promote solutions that identify the root causes underlying 
current and emerging threats, reveal possible mismatches between local and national as 
well as regional and international policies and programmes, and strengthen the capacities 
of Governments and people to reduce the impact of current challenges and prevent the 
occurrence of future crises.
In other words, human security’s emphasis on context specificity ensures that action will take into 
account ‘a more nuanced understanding of how different countries, districts within countries and 
groups of people experience the multidimensional aspects of poverty’ (UNTFHS 2016: 12). The 
local factors receive extra attention from human security. As put by UNTFHS (2016: 12): 
By disaggregating social and economic indicators at the national and local levels, the human 
security approach is able to uncover the various factors that impede those who are most 
vulnerable, including women, minority groups and economically marginalized popula-
tions, from accessing essential public services and economic opportunities. Subsequently, 
services can be tailored to meet their specific needs. National and local priorities are estab-
lished to advance an inclusive development process where the benefits of economic growth 
can reach the most marginalized and result in greater impact on the overall growth and 
social capital of respective communities. 
Human security’s multidimensional focus on both security and development can also benefit 
SSG/R, which do not necessarily place key importance on development. This is especially advan-
tageous, as the SDGs bring together both security and development goals. Therefore, there is a 
need to link SSG/R more tightly to human security, in order to help achieve the targets of SDG-16.
None of today’s challenges can indeed be resolved in isolation. Human security emphasizes the 
interconnectivity among today’s problems. It therefore ‘complements and enriches the mecha-
nisms that will be needed in order to attain the SDGs’ (UNTFHS 2016: 13). As the world strives to 
meet the SDGs in general and SDG-16 in particular, it is well advised to utilize human security’s 
comparative advantage of promoting interconnected responses to cross-cutting problems. As the 
Commission on Human Security (2003: 2) has warned, the solution to such problems ‘cannot be 
effective if it comes fragmented – from those dealing with rights, those with security, those with 
humanitarian concerns and those with development.’ As the SDG-16 Conference (2019: 10) reaf-
firmed, ‘Just, peaceful and inclusive societies can’t be achieved if violence against children and 
women isn’t tackled through a multi-sectoral and comprehensive approach.’ This directly illus-
trates the strength and centrality of the human security approach in achieving SDG-16. 
Furthermore, through its emphasis on a ‘comprehensive approach to combating poverty and 
promoting sustainable development,’ human security offers a ‘practical approach for “why” 
and “how” the different parts of the United Nations system must come together to utilize their 
resources in a more integrated manner’ (UNTFHS 2016: 12). In order to establish enduring peace, 
it is important to avoid the ‘unintended consequences’ of incoordination, when there are multiple 
international actors involved in peacebuilding (Dursun-Özkanca 2016: 50). Therefore, in order 
to successfully implement SDG-16, the stakeholders should emphasize the importance of human 
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security’s comprehensive approach. As the SDG-16 Conference (2019: 17) recommends, ‘Intera-
gency cooperation – particularly among public sector financial management, revenue authorities 
and authorities on anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), as 
well as relevant small arms control authorities – should be strengthened.’ It attracts attention to 
the existence of ‘silos,’ and argues that they ‘are due in part to the failure to move beyond diversity 
to inclusion and non-discrimination’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 17). ‘Instead of breaking silos 
outright,’ the SDG-16 Conference (2019: 17) recommends, ‘teaching them how to dance together’ 
as a long-term strategy. In this context, human security emerges as an important tool in the imple-
mentation of SDGs and SDG-16 in particular, to teach ‘silos’ ‘how to dance together.’ 
Human security emphasizes a multi-stakeholder approach to complex problems. It brings 
together a broad range of stakeholders, to generate a more impactful and long-lasting outcome. 
The same is true for SDGs and SSG/R to a certain extent, albeit SSR has a long way to go to 
incorporate multi-stakeholders effectively into SSR missions, especially when it comes to local 
ownership. Human security has the advantage of ‘guiding a more comprehensive and coordinated 
response by the international community to complex and multifaceted threats’ (UNGA 2013: 9). 
A good example is Mongolia, where a comprehensive approach was pursued in response to the 
‘persistent poverty and recurring droughts’ that adversely affected the well-being of isolated rural 
communities (UNGA 2013: 14). Several UN agencies along with national and local governments 
and civil society organizations worked collaboratively to successfully provide ‘integrated sup-
port in the form of income-generating opportunities and access to information; improvements 
in sanitation and basic health-care services; and education and skills training’ (UNGA 2013: 14). 
In Yemen too, the comprehensive approach of human security was put in action recently, as the 
UN collaborated with ‘254 humanitarian partners to agree on priorities and a coherent strategy to 
meet the needs of 13 million people’ (UNGA 2019: 81). 
Over the course of years, human security added a third pillar to its original pillars of freedom 
from fear and freedom from want: the freedom to live in dignity (UNTFHS 2016). It acknowl-
edged the need to address problems at the personal, local, regional, and global levels simulta-
neously. It also called for responses to be preventive in nature. These are all attributes that are 
emphasized by SDG-16 as well as SSG/R. 
Protection and empowerment lie at the heart of human security, just like they do in SDG-16 and 
SSG/R. ‘As a people-centred, context-specific, comprehensive and prevention-oriented approach 
that advances both top-down protection and bottom-up empowerment solutions,’ human security 
nicely complements SDG-16 (UNTFHS 2016: 11) and helps boost the power of SSG/R in facilitat-
ing the accomplishment of SDG-16. The goal is ‘to empower the people to fend for themselves’ and 
to enhance the livelihood of vulnerable people (The Commission on Human Security 2003: 6). 
In Timor-Leste, for instance, ‘the establishment of community-based self-help groups was con-
sidered central to promoting an inclusive framework for reducing poverty, improving access to 
essential services and enhancing social inclusion,’ illustrating the importance of people-centered 
and participative components of human security in a post-conflict setting (UNGA 2013: 12). 
Moreover, it is important to discuss the ‘do no harm’ principle in this context. It is ‘the mini-
mum standard of practice to avoid causing inadvertent harm,’ and seeks to ‘understand the con-
text,’ ‘understand the interaction between the intervention and the context,’ and ‘act upon that 
understanding in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the conflict’ 
(Conflict Prevention 2020). It acknowledges that ‘aid is not neutral,’ as ‘aid and how it is admin-
istered can cause harm or can strengthen capacities for peace in the midst of conflict-affected 
communities … [due to] transfer of resources’ (Conflict Prevention 2020). Therefore, ‘the transfer 
of resources and the manner in which staff conduct the programmes can strengthen local capaci-
ties for peace, build on connectors that bring communities together, and reduce the divisions and 
sources of tensions that can lead to destructive conflict’ (Conflict Prevention 2020). Applied to 
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SSG/R and SDG-16, ‘do no harm’ concept becomes a decisive factor in the success of institutional 
reform. For instance, critics have said that ‘military assistance programmes of the donor coun-
tries in fragile states remain piecemeal and uncoordinated (in terms of training, doctrine and 
equipment procurement),’ or assistance on DDR ‘appear not to take enough account of specific 
conditions based in integrated economic, social and military analysis’ (OECD 2010: 18). Human 
security’s emphasis on the ‘do no harm’ principle would add an additional layer of protection by 
preventing unintended harm while conducting complex missions. 
With regard to access to justice, the ‘donor community should play a more active role in frag-
ile states in raising awareness of individual rights and duties’ (OECD 2010: 19). Nevertheless, it 
should be done by paying ‘attention to how such campaigns affect social expectations, the balance 
of power and the political settlement underpinning the state’ (OECD 2010: 19). Human secu-
rity’s context-specific approach along with its mantra of ‘leaving no one behind’ is instrumental in 
addressing these sizeable gaps in statebuilding, and admirably complement SSG/R and SDG-16 
in creating stronger institutions that will take into account all citizens’ interests. 
Finally, the human security approach has been increasingly implemented since the end of the 
1990s with much success. It has been applied to over 220 projects and programs under the direc-
tion of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) (UNTFHS 2016: 11). For instance, 
in March 2011, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon authorized for the formation of a task 
force, consisting of representatives from ‘the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Political Affairs, the Peacebuild-
ing Support Office, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Women and the World Bank’ in order to ‘integrate 
responses to transnational organized crime into the peacekeeping, peacebuilding, security and 
development activities of the United Nations, with [UN Office on Drugs and Crime] UNODC 
and the Department of Political Affairs as co-chairs’ (UNODC 2012). This is referred to as the 
‘One-UN Approach,’ and has ‘improved coordination between stakeholders on organized crime 
networks and drugs trafficking’ (Farr, Schnabel & Krupanski 2012: 337). As noted by UNTFHS 
(2016: 11), ‘Through these initiatives, the added value of the human security approach in bolster-
ing the operational effectiveness of the United Nations system and magnifying the impact of its 
work on the ground has been well documented.’ As demonstrated in this section, human security 
offers numerous important comparative advantages in successfully achieving the SDG-16 targets 
while simultaneously contributing to the success of SSG/R. 
b. Weaknesses of human security as a bridge
i. Narrow and broad definitions of human security
While human security’s primary goal is the protection of human lives, there is some contro-
versy as to what the individuals should be protected from and through what means (Shani 2007; 
Tadjbakhsh 2013). On this topic, there are those who favor a broad definition and those who 
prefer a narrow version of human security (Tadjbakhsh 2013: 43). The narrow understanding 
of the concept of human security argues that the international community should prioritize 
the insecurities and target military or physical threats to survival (Bueger & Vennesson 2009; 
Tadjbakhsh 2013). The broader understanding of the concept argues that the international com-
munity should expand the focus and include ‘non-physical threats and injustice,’ including eco-
nomic inequalities, and lack of representation at political, social, and cultural levels (Bueger 
& Vennesson 2009: 18). As noted by Tadjbakhsh (2013: 44), the broader understanding of the 
concept consists of:
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freedom from fear (conditions that allow individuals and groups protection from  
direct threats to their safety and physical integrity, including various forms of direct and 
indirect violence, intended or not); freedom from want (conditions that allow for protec-
tion of basic needs, quality of life, livelihoods and enhanced human welfare) and freedom 
from indignity (condition where individuals and groups are assured of the protection of 
their fundamental rights, allowed to make choices and take advantage of opportunities  
in their everyday lives).
While Japan led the way for the broader understanding of the concept, with an emphasis on 
‘freedom from want,’ emphasizing the need to secure basic human needs with regards to food, 
economy, health, and environment, the Human Security Network, led by Canada, chose to focus 
on a narrower understanding of the concept by focusing on ‘freedom from fear’ from the use 
of force and violence (Burgess & Owen 2004). As such, one may make the argument that the 
broader understanding is focusing more on development, whereas the narrower interpretation 
of the concept is focusing more on security. The narrow approach ‘may opt for policing strat-
egies and humanitarian interventions to protect individuals in immediate danger’ (Tadjbakhsh 
2013: 49). Nevertheless, ‘Restrictiveness would endanger the human security perspective of inter-
connection and is thereby less suitable as a perspective for research, mobilization, and civil society 
engagement – the way towards major long run impact’ (Gasper 2010: 20). 
Therefore, human security should ‘remain flexible enough to allow for a deeper understand-
ing of the root of insecurities and capacities to address them’ (Tadjbakhsh 2013: 54). Many indi-
cate that the broad approach requires long-term responses and prioritization (Oberleitner 2005; 
Tadjbakhsh 2013). For instance, Tadjbakhsh (2013: 48) argues, ‘Dignity-related threats’ should 
not ‘be dealt with through short-term problem-solving approaches,’ but require ‘strategic plan-
ning, root cause analysis, [and] preventive action.’ This paper makes a case that the narrow under-
standing alone does not provide a good bridge between SSG/R and SDG-16 and that the broader 
concept of human security is more suitable for the job at hand due to its focus on a long-term 
approach and emphasis on strategic planning. 
As the SDGs have a 15-year timeline, a broader understanding of human security offers a more 
comprehensive and feasible alternative for meeting the targets of SDG-16. While it is true that 
the narrow understanding of human security is still found in some targets of SDG-16, such as 
Target 16.1 and Target 16.2, there are also many targets that seem to have embraced the broader 
understanding of human security. A broader understanding of human security would put SSG/R 
in a better position to help achieve SDG-16, as it would not only address short-term problems but 
also long-term challenges effectively. Otherwise, as indicated by an in-depth analysis of transitions 
from military to civilian power (Myanmar and Pakistan), transitions from ‘war to peace’ (Colom-
bia, Sierra Leone), and transitions that resulted from independence (South Sudan) conducted by 
the UNDP and Oxford Policy Management, ‘key challenges and weaknesses which remain unad-
dressed in moments of transition, risk becoming more entrenched structural problems’ that ‘are 
increasingly difficult to solve as time goes on’ (UNDP & Oxford Policy Management 2019: 34).
Here, this manuscript makes the argument that the narrow understanding of human security 
mainly focuses on negative peace, whereas the broader understanding of human security also 
highlights positive peace. Negative peace mainly revolves around freedom from fear, as it empha-
sizes the absence of violence and war. On the other hand, freedom from want and freedom from 
indignity emphasize positive peace, as they seek to further integrate individuals into the soci-
ety and create and sustain peaceful societies. Since SDG-16 contains both negative and positive 
peace targets, the broader understanding of human security is better situated to accomplish these 
targets overall. 
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ii. Actionability of the human security concept
Another criticism of human security is that it mainly focuses on principles rather than imple-
mentation (Paris 2001). With certain exceptions, the same argument may be made about SSG/R 
(Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the focus on 
principles is inconsequential. As noted by Dursun-Özkanca and Vandemoortele (2012: 147), ‘Like 
SSR, human security seeks a transformation of the way security is conceived.’ 
Like the SDGs in general, and SDG-16 in particular, the human security concept has been crit-
icized as too ambiguous and difficult to implement. Paris, for instance, states that the human 
security concept is ‘too vague to generate specific research questions’ (Paris 2001: 93) and argues 
that it is mostly ‘hot air’ or ‘empty rhetoric’ (2001: 88). Paris (2001: 102) concludes that due to its 
vagueness, ‘it verges on meaninglessness – and consequently offers little practical guidance to aca-
demics who might be interested in applying the concept, or to policymakers who must prioritize 
among competing policy goals.’ Others indicate that empirical applications of human security are 
scarce (Ambrosetti 2008; Chandler 2008) and note that ‘human security notions are often hard to 
apply in policy’ (Gasper 2010: 19). Such critics add that this is due to ‘problems concerning who 
cares and disagreements over who is responsible for action and who pays, reflecting the boundary- 
crossing character of the issues considered’ (Gasper 2010: 19). Nevertheless, over the past dec-
ade, there have been an increasing number of studies that were conducted on the effectiveness of 
human security in delivering measurable outcomes, creating a ‘second-generation human secu-
rity’ paradigm that focuses on operationalization and deepening of the ideas of individual security 
(Bell et al. 2013; Martin & Owen 2010; Newman 2016; Solar 2019; Werthes, Heaven, & Vollnhals 
2011; Zeigermann 2020). Still, it has been criticized for producing some undesirable outcomes 
with regard to reconstruction of armed forces in a post-conventional war world (Solar 2019). 
There is still limited knowledge on ‘how the institutional settings of international partnerships 
with conflict-affected states influence behavioural choices of households, firms, the interna-
tional community, conflicting parties and elites; and how these affect broad development goals’ 
(Zeigermann 2020).
iii. Human security and national sovereignty
While human security is typically based on idealist/liberal principles, the UNGA (2012) document 
emphasizes national sovereignty, due to concerns raised by UN member states on the Responsi-
bility to Protect doctrine. UNGA (2012: 2) acknowledges that ‘Governments retain the primary 
role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens.’ It adds, 
‘The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support 
to Governments, upon their request,’ and acknowledges ‘that projects funded by the [UNTFHS] 
should receive the consent of the recipient State’ (UNGA 2012: 2). While it is commendable that 
there is an emphasis on national ownership, these quotes may be interpreted as attributing key 
significance to the concept of national sovereignty vis-à-vis human security. As the historical data 
demonstrates, governments may conveniently forego the rights of their citizens, causing threats to 
citizens’ well-being, survival, and dignity. Therefore, acknowledging that the role of the interna-
tional community is simply to complement the governments may be interpreted as giving a blank 
check to some of the most atrocious governments around the world. 
c. Implications of COVID-19 for human security
Finally, there are important changes taking place globally in the post-COVID-19 world order, 
ranging from ‘nationalist deglobalization,’ (increased nationalism paired with a process of 
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uncoupling in the global economy) to less democratic participation, more centralization, the rise 
of a surveillance state, erosion of human rights, and to rising inequalities (Cooper & Aitchison 
2020: 5). There is also the decline of multilateralism in global affairs and a ‘fractured’ liberal 
international order (Poast 2020), which may present further challenges for the comprehensive 
approach of human security and SSG/R to be successfully implemented to achieve SDG-16. As 
more and more countries are resorting to self-help and unilateralism rather than acting through 
international institutions, human security’s prospects for successful implementation to accom-
plish SDG-16 decreases. 
The COVID-19 pandemic similarly presents financial difficulties on fundraising efforts for 
the application of the human security approach to global problems. Fragile and weak states are 
expected to be disproportionately influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic ‘due to their resource, 
infrastructure, and capacity deficits, but because of gaps in political legitimacy,’ which, in turn, 
may exacerbate instability in such places over the long term (Graff 2020). The pandemic may also 
intensify the grievances that are already at the center of armed conflicts and lead ‘authoritarian 
regimes prone to using government resources to suppress dissent’ to step up these tactics and take 
advantage of the crisis to further consolidate power at the expense of civil society actors (Quirk 
2020). Nationalism and populism are on the rise, making countries more volatile and prone to 
conflict. Therefore, it is even more essential to put a renewed emphasis on human security and the 
SDG-16-SSG/R nexus at this point in time.

CHAPTER 8
Next Steps: Policy Recommendations
SSG/R efforts must take account of economic issues, particularly the lack of employment oppor-
tunities for demobilized personnel as a result of DDR, and corruption’s impact as a barrier against 
SSG/R as well as sustainable development. For instance, corruption has significant consequences 
for policy implementation and public service delivery (Hope 2020b). As such, SSG/R should go 
back to their development roots and better connect themselves with the sustainable development 
concept by operationalizing sustainable development goals as means for achieving better results 
in reforming the security and justice sectors. In doing so, SSR missions should put an increased 
emphasis on the buy-in factor for achieving the targets of SDG-16 from the whole population. 
Security sector actors should spend more time deliberating how to present the SSR initiatives in 
a way to create more popular support for such initiatives. Against this background, local own-
ership, participative approach, and legitimacy emerge as central concepts. The global trends in 
the post-COVID-19 world present an additional set of challenges for SSG/R as well as SDG-16. 
Consequently, democratic SSG acquires the utmost importance, and so do its vital components of 
oversight and accountability. 
a. How can SSG/R help with SDG-16 targets?
This section addresses many ways SSG/R can help with SDG-16 targets, such as through promot-
ing greater institutionalization and good governance principles, as well as its focus on reforming 
the security and justice institutions, by forming a closer connection between states and their 
populations. It may also help with its emphasis on good governance and capacity development 
(Hope 2020b). SSG/R may develop new tools to tackle transnational challenges and help achieve 
the targets entailed in SDG-16, especially through epistemic learning and sharing of good prac-
tices among epistemic communities around the world. For instance, SSG/R may enable national 
security sector actors to cooperate and jointly develop norms with regard to security provision 
or attainment of concrete targets listed in SDG-16. As noted in Resolution 2553 adopted by the 
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UNSC in December 2020, SSG and institutions ‘can be enhanced through support to and inclu-
sive national security dialogues; national security sector reviews and mappings; national security 
policy and strategy; national security legislation; national security sector plans; security sector 
public expenditure reviews; and national security oversight, management and coordination’ 
(UNSC 2020b). 
In order to achieve Agenda 2030’s goals, there is a need for a ‘strong involvement of public ser-
vice institutions,’ including the ones operating under the framework of security and justice sector, 
and robust ‘oversight mechanisms,’ including NHRIs (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR & UN Women 2019: 
5). ‘Institutional transformation in the oversight, management and services of security and justice 
sector institutions’ emerge as critical for meeting the targets of the SDGs (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR 
& UN Women 2019: 5). Therefore, in implementation, the human security concept should be 
linked to more operationalized policy tools under the framework of SSG/R and SDG-16. Other-
wise, policies that rely on exclusion, discrimination, and inequality will prove to be significant 
roadblocks in achieving SDG-16 targets (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR & UN Women 2019). Accord-
ingly, drawing on the people-centered, inclusive, bottom-up, and context-specific attributes of 
human security, this section specifically focuses on oversight and accountability as well as par-
ticipative approach and local ownership, noting that they hold the key for successful utilization of 
SSG/R’s help in achieving the SDG-16 targets. 
i. Oversight and accountability
This section focuses on the twin principles of oversight and accountability and examines how 
these concepts relate to SSG/R and SDG-16’s different targets. It highlights their importance for 
resolving the problems SDG-16 is seeking to tackle. Oversight and accountability are among the 
basic tenets of democracies and ensure that defense, security, and intelligence actors are placed 
‘under a legal obligation to answer truly and completely the questions put to it by’ the authorities 
to which it is accountable’ (Hannah, O’Brien & Rathmell 2005: 12). After all, it is well established 
in the literature that recurring conflict and civil wars happen in countries ‘where government 
elites are unaccountable to the public, where public does not participate in political life, and where 
information is not transparent’ (Fearon 2011; Grant & Keohane 2005; Walter 2014: 1243). Thus, 
oversight and accountability are key elements to ensure peace and justice. 
Oversight ‘carries out “scrutiny” in the pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness and propriety,’ and 
‘may take place before, during and after the fact’ (Gill 2020: 4). It ‘must be distinguished from 
“accountability” which requires officials to explain actions and to suffer the consequences or put 
the matter right if errors are made’ (Gill 2020: 4). In that sense, as noted earlier in the report, over-
sight is a ‘precondition for accountability’ (Gill 2020: 4). 
Accountability is the existence of ‘clear expectations for security provision,’ and as ‘independent 
authorities oversee[ing] whether these expectations are met’ (DCAF 2015: 3). If it is determined 
that such expectations are not met, then sanctions are imposed in order to remedy the situation 
(DCAF 2015). Alluding to the importance of oversight and accountability, the 2013 Report of the 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (UNSG 2013: 5) notes: 
In all contexts, the United Nations is confronted by the need to ensure that it supports 
frameworks and interventions in the area of security sector reform that are inclusive and 
accountable, comply with human rights standards, and aim to enhance the social contract 
between the State and society and, ultimately, between the people and the security institu-
tions empowered to protect them. 
As made very clear by the former UN Secretary-General (UNSG 2013), accountability and over-
sight empower the people, by enabling them to hold the authorities responsible. In that sense, it 
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is directly related to the concept of human security’s people-centered view of security that high-
lights not only the provision of services such as protection but also empowerment. The focus 
on human security and freedom from fear prompted states to ‘reorient security sector-related 
services from the imperative of external defence to the security of citizens and the upholding of 
their human rights’ (Caparini & Cole 2008: 12). Due to its people-centered nature, human secu-
rity holds that ‘the provision of security should be directly responsive to the needs of the people,’ 
allocating a significant role to be played by accountability and transparency (Caparini & Cole 
2008: 16). Therefore, information should ‘only be withheld [from ordinary citizens] for legitimate 
and tightly defined reasons’ (Caparini & Cole 2008: 16). SSG/R similarly focus on the concepts of 
oversight and accountability, as they are basic principles of good governance. There is an increas-
ing scholarly attention paid to public security programs that focus on ‘safeguarding human rights 
and democratic freedoms, rather than “national” security’ (Caparini & Cole 2008: 12). 
There is also an increasing recognition of the linkages between human security, sustainable 
development, and SSG/R with particular attention to democratic control and accountability. For 
instance, in 2017, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, and the European Commission 
adopted the New European Consensus on Development: Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future, recog-
nizing the interlinkages between these concepts (Deneckere, Neat & Hauck 2020). The document 
was adopted in response to the UN’s 2030 Agenda. It acknowledges the mantra of the SDGs, ‘leave 
no-one behind’ and notes that the EU ‘will implement a rights-based approach to development 
cooperation, encompassing all human rights,’ and ‘promote inclusion and participation, non-
discrimination, equality and equity, transparency and accountability’ (European Council 2017). 
Similarly, the ‘bottom-up’ SSR approach, which prioritizes ‘smaller initiatives with immediate 
results,’ such as human resources management, provides ‘the means to build trust and long-term 
informal relations with change makers for political dialogue and … [paves] the way for longer-
term engagements’ (Deneckere, Neat & Hauck 2020: 31). Therefore, the bottom-up approach ‘can 
have transformational effects in terms of making security institutions more accountable and more 
responsive to human security concerns’ (Deneckere, Neat & Hauck 2020: 31).
As cautioned by many, in the security sector, ‘excessive secrecy can be counter-productive’ 
(Caparini & Cole 2008: 16; UK DFID 2002), as it may be ‘used as a cover for financial misman-
agement and illegal activities’ (UK DFID 2002: 29). Ensuring accountability and oversight may 
contribute to the efforts to reverse ‘the negative effects of “rent-seeking” (seeking income through 
positions of political power) and corruption on development’ (Brzoska 2003: 14). Effective control 
of the security sector, and particularly the intelligence agencies, is important ‘due to the inherent 
secrecy of their activities’ (Hannah, O’Brien & Rathmell 2005: 12) and ‘the secrecy laws [that] 
may hinder efforts to enhance transparency’ (Fluri & Born 2003: 30). It ensures that security and 
intelligence actors do not act with impunity (Brzoska 2003). Oversight and accountability ensure 
that police, military, and intelligence agencies are ‘serving the state as a whole rather than narrow 
political or other interests’ (Gill 2020; Hannah, O’Brien & Rathmell 2005: vii), and that ‘pub-
lic funds are properly accounted for’ (Hannah, O’Brien & Rathmell 2005: 12). They also ensure 
that security forces do not ‘become agents of repression themselves, disregarding human rights’ 
(Born, Buckland & McDermott 2014; Brzoska 2003: 30). Therefore, capacity development of over-
sight bodies, such as ombuds institutions, emerges as a central endeavor in SSR. Should they 
‘lack the independence, credibility, expertise and resources that are required,’ they may ‘fail to ful-
fil their mandates’ (Born, Buckland & McDermott 2014: 4). Accomplishing this in SSR missions 
is easier said than done, as SSR support typically goes into train and equip missions. To illustrate, 
for the SSR mission in Mali, ‘about 80% of international SSR support in the country’ went into 
‘train and equip, while barely 20% of support cover[ed] accountability and governance aspects’ 
(DCAF 2021).
Management and oversight of security and justice are conducted by state and non-state actors 
(Myrttinen 2019). State authorities include civilian administrative bodies like ministries of 
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defense, interior, foreign affairs and finance, state oversight agencies like parliamentary bodies, 
ombudspersons, national human rights commissions, and the judiciary. Non-state actors that are 
involved in oversight include civil society organizations, academia, think tanks, and the media 
(Myrttinen 2019: 15). Accountability and oversight protect citizens from abuses and boost the 
ability of citizens to hold providers of security and justice accountable through increased respon-
siveness and enhanced accessibility to security and justice sector services. It, in turn, leads to 
greater ‘confidence and legitimacy needed to overcome societal mistrust in violence-affected 
countries’ (DCAF 2021).
Many studies have looked into the role of civil society, media, the legislative branch, and the 
executive branch in providing oversight of the police, military, and intelligence agencies and 
emphasized democratic policing and especially community policing principles, as well as dem-
ocratic oversight principles (Caparini 2004; Caparini & Cole 2008; Hope 2020a). For capacity 
development to succeed, it should be an ‘an endogenous process, supported by external actors’ 
(Born, Buckland & McDermott 2014: 17). Some successful examples of the operationalization of 
oversight and accountability principles in SSR missions include the ‘bottom-up accountability’ 
concept implemented in Ecuador, leading to ‘increased citizen participation in governance’ 
through the ‘citizen observatories known as Veedurias,’ allowing citizens to monitor the imple-
mentation of the country’s National Security Strategy and human security at different governance 
levels ranging from the municipal to national levels (DCAF 2021). Similarly, police-civilian part-
nerships may prove to be important for enhancing oversight and accountability in the security 
sector (United States Agency for International Development [USAID] 2020).
The importance of oversight and accountability becomes clearer in the context of newly democ-
ratizing countries. Democratization is often associated with a rise in political violence, as it often 
undermines the established privileges and raises political expectations that are not always or easily 
fulfilled (Luckham 2003). Furthermore, in newly democratizing countries, there may not neces-
sarily be laws that guarantee freedom of access to information (Fluri & Born 2003). There may be 
tensions between oversight and efficiency of the security sector in post-transitional countries that 
recently made the switch from authoritarian to democratic regimes (Barany et al. 2019). There-
fore, constitutional reform and SSR processes intersect in democratic transitions from military 
rule, civil war, and authoritarian regimes (Bisarya & Choudry 2020). 
Moreover, the rising global military expenditures, deficiencies in the management of security 
services and the justice system, wasting of public resources through such deficiencies, violation of 
human rights by security providers and intelligence services, lack of access to information, under-
developed civil society, security challenges in the aftermath of civil wars and conflicts, refugees 
and internally displaced people, inefficiencies in rehabilitating former combatants, lack of institu-
tionalization, the proliferation of small arms and organized crime networks, and the rise of private 
military and security corporations all present different challenges for oversight and accountability. 
As Ball (2010: 41) notes, in SSR missions, ‘All support should be based on the understanding that 
a security sector that is accountable to civil authorities and ordinary people is structured to meet 
security threats to individuals, their communities and their country.’ Against this background, the 
importance of creating effective civilian oversight mechanisms as well as developing institutions 
to provide security is highlighted more (Ball et al. 2003). 
To illustrate, one of the trends that have been identified in the SSR literature is the privatization 
of security (Portada, Riley & Gambone 2014; Richards & Smith 2007; Schultz & Yeung 2008). 
There are many private military and private security companies (PMSCs) that operate in the pro-
vision of internal and external security around the world, and they operate in a ‘legal vacuum,’ 
without much institutional framework that regulates their conduct (DCAF 2017; Tougas 2009: 
322). Privatization of security calls for a more rigorous democratic oversight, as such organiza-
tions are not under the direct influence of governments. The Montreux Document as well as the 
Next Steps: Policy Recommendations 59
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers are steps in the right direc-
tion for the legal reforms to influence the PMSCs’ ‘operating practices in areas such as vetting, 
training and grievance procedures’ (DCAF 2017: 12). Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General’s 
report in 2013 acknowledges that the UN does not ‘as yet, see how best to acknowledge’ these 
security institutions, and asks for a better understanding of ‘their role in the provision of secu-
rity’ and in SSR (UNSG 2013: 5). It adds, ‘The emerging trend towards the outsourcing to private 
companies of support to security sector reform introduces a new set of dynamics and challenges, 
including an increased need to ensure national ownership and democratic control and oversight’ 
(UNSG 2013: 5).
The oversight of intelligence agencies may also present additional challenges due to lack of 
political will and the existence of asymmetric information (Gill 2020). Therefore, for oversight 
to be effective, there is a need for a ‘clear statutory mandate, independence from the executive…, 
quality membership and adequate resources to employ expert staff, ability to maintain secrecy 
and thus gain trust of agencies and public, and political will to use powers in fulfilling mandate’ 
(Gill 2020: 5). There is a ‘trilemma’ when it comes to oversight (Cayford, Pieters & Hijzen 2018: 
1011): that is, it requires ‘effectiveness, cost, and legality/proportionality’, which is an ‘impossible’ 
task to ‘successfully address all three elements’ (Cayford, Pieters & Hijzen 2018: 1012). Such chal-
lenges are there not only for the newly democratized countries, but also for consolidated ones as 
well, presenting challenges for democratic SSG (Gill 2020).
SSG/R are based on an assumption that ‘an ineffective and poorly governed security sector rep-
resents a decisive obstacle to peace, stability, poverty reduction, sustainable development, rule of 
law, good governance and the respect for human rights’ and that ‘responsible and accountable 
security forces reduce the risk of conflict’ (Wulf 2011: 339). In that context, the human security 
concept’s comparative advantage is heightened, as it holds a more multidimensional approach 
to interconnected problems. To illustrate, ‘In the absence of democratic civilian control, secu-
rity forces are able to act with impunity – with negative consequences for both human develop-
ment and security’ (Wulf 2011: 342). Therefore, over time, international donors have increasingly 
acknowledged the importance of security issues on development (Wulf 2011).
It is especially critical that beneficiary populations have means ‘to hold donors accountable to 
their stated commitments to provide sustainable and effective development-sensitive SSR support’ 
(Baldassini et al. 2018; Schnabel 2012: 64). In the same vein, donors should hold state authorities 
accountable to make sure that ‘reforms are effectively implemented, and security and develop-
ment objectives are met’ (Baldassini et al. 2018; Schnabel 2012: 64). This is referred to as ‘mutual 
accountability in SSR processes’ (Schnabel 2012: 64). 
Traditionally, parliaments have not received ‘direct support through SSR programming in post-
conflict and fragile contexts’ (DCAF 2017: 7). But more recently, there has been some good pro-
gress made on ‘the re-engagement of donors to strengthen the lawmaking and oversight functions 
over the security and justice sector,’ which recognized the ‘critical’ role of parliaments in ‘sustain-
able and accountable SSR processes’ (DCAF 2017: 7). Consultations with people about their needs 
and expectations further enhance the legitimacy of the judicial and security institutions (DCAF 
2017). Accordingly, citizen involvement, public participation, and engagement are important 
‘from the formulation and design to implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases’ (SDG-16 
Conference 2019: 4). On this point, human security can contribute significantly to ensure over-
sight and accountability by more actively involving the citizens in assessing whether SDG-16 is 
meeting its targets. Perceptions play an important role in assessing human security, which in turn 
has significant implications for meeting the SDG-16 targets. For instance, ‘mainstreaming gender 
in SSR’ by ‘increasing gender awareness within the institutions’ and ‘empowering women and 
youth’ are important ‘in sustainable and effective prevention of conflict efforts’ and in preventing 
‘gender-based violence’ (DCAF 2017: 9). 
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Ensuring that ‘the culture of impunity’ is changed in security and justice institutions will be made 
possible through ‘robust accountability mechanisms’ that combine all ‘three models of account-
ability: internal, external by state institutions, and external by non-state institutions’ (DCAF 2017: 
10). As noted by DCAF (2017: 10), ‘State level accountability is recognised as legitimate but may 
lack impartiality and often fails due to weak institutional capacity, cost implications, and the need 
for sustained political commitment to a culture of accountability.’ Similarly, non-state alternatives 
involving the community and the media, ‘can be cost effective, quick to put into place and accessi-
ble, but may lack political clout, access and coherence’ (DCAF 2017: 10). Finally, ‘internal mecha-
nisms can be an effective way of holding peers to account, but often lack transparency and public 
trust’ (DCAF 2017: 10). Human security effectively fills these gaps in accountability mechanisms, 
as it emphasizes strong institutional mechanisms through the whole-of-government approach, 
the buy-in process and strategic coherence, and perceptions and people-centered perspectives. 
Inadequate financing, ‘misappropriation of funds, or poorly executed budgets’ are among the 
reasons for ‘poor performance of SSR processes, endemic corruption, and limited public confi-
dence in the sector’ (DCAF 2017: 11). ‘Lack of salary payments’ to security forces is a ‘contribut-
ing factor to low morale and ineffectiveness of security forces in a large number of post-conflict 
and fragile contexts, contributing to a lack of preventative capacity and often contributing to risks 
that security institutions become purveyors of insecurity’ (DCAF 2017: 11). Therefore, effective 
management of public finances ‘yielded positive results on the prevention of violent conflict’ and 
‘boosted morale’ among the officers in places such as Cote d’Ivoire, where before the reform defi-
ciencies in salary payment caused ‘repressive behavior of the military towards the population’ 
(DCAF 2017: 11).
As put by the SDG-16 Conference (2019: 2), ‘Corruption and mismanagement erode people’s 
confidence in their governments. These must be resolved not just to deliver results but also to 
strengthen trust and promote stable societies.’ ‘Corruption, bribery, theft and tax evasion cost 
developing countries US$1.26 trillion per year’ (UNDP Brussels 2017). As a result of successfully 
tackling corruption, funds could be effectively used in areas they are allocated to, further contrib-
uting to sustainable development and institutional reform of the security sector. 
SDG-16 delves into the ‘core elements of a social compact between state and society’ and 
seeks to guarantee ‘a match between people’s expectations of what the state and other actors 
will deliver … and the institutional capacity available within the state and other actors to meet 
those expectations’ (UNDP 2016). It seeks to provide improved rule of law, a fair justice system, 
legal identity, safety, access to information, and opportunities for inclusion (UNDP 2016). Thus, 
accountable, responsive, and transparent institutions are of vital importance for achieving the 
targets of SDG-16 and to ensure the legitimacy of the security sector.
ii. Participative approach and local ownership
This section examines the concepts of participative approach and local ownership from the per-
spective of both SSG/R and SDG-16 and emphasizes how these principles can help achieve better 
outcomes in SDG-16. As emphasized by the concept note published by the South African Presi-
dency of the UNSC in December 2020, SSR’s success is measured by its ‘ability to deliver security 
and protection to diverse sections of the population and to serve as a basis for reconciliation 
through dialogue and the inclusion of local communities and their traditional security arrange-
ments’ (UNSC 2020a: 2). Similarly, many scholars attract attention to the contradictions between 
the practice of international trusteeship in post-conflict societies in the post-Cold War world 
and the concept of self-governance. They maintain that international statebuilding endeavors pose 
hurdles against a more organic form of government (Chandler 1999; Chesterman 2004; Knudsen 
& Laustsen 2006) and highlight the fallacies in the argument that liberal democracies are a 
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solution to post-conflict peacebuilding (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009). Liberal peacebuild-
ing is criticized for its application of a standardized liberal model, which is deemed both insensi-
tive to local contexts and disempower communities (Duffield 2010; Dursun-Özkanca 2018; Pugh, 
Cooper & Turner 2008; Richmond 2006). Further criticism holds that it has not so far achieved 
good results in terms of democratization and rule of law (Duffield 2010; Richmond 2006). 
Others contend that liberal peacebuilding diverts the attention away from ‘the realities of policy 
implementation’ (Cubitt 2013: 112) and undermines the notion of local ownership (De Coning 
2013). Cubitt (2013: 112), for instance, calls for the formation of ‘more locally focused’ models of 
democracy and economic restructuring by identifying ‘the structures that work better … [and] 
local actors [that are] more dedicated to change.’ De Coning (2013: 6) notes that because inter-
national actors believe that ‘adopting neoliberal norms and institutions is ultimately in the best 
interest of the country in transition, some degree of coercion [from the outside and from the top-
down] is justified.’ Critics of liberal peacebuilding instead offer ‘bottom-up’ or ‘local’ approaches 
(De Coning 2013: 6; Dursun-Özkanca 2018).
Local ownership means that ‘the reform of security policies, institutions, and activities in a given 
country … [are] designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather than external 
actors’ (Nathan 2007: 9). Over the last decade, much has been written on local ownership (Donais 
2008, 2009; Dursun-Özkanca 2018; Dursun-Özkanca &Vandemoortele 2012; Goodhand & Sedra 
2010; Nathan 2007), yet its meaning is still disputed, as it means varying degrees of local control for 
different people (Chesterman 2007; Dursun-Özkanca 2018). Local ownership should be under-
stood as both process – constantly updated during a mission to maximize local participation, 
and outcome – representing an exit strategy for international actors (Caplan 2006; Chesterman 
2007; Dursun-Özkanca 2018; Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012; Hansen 2008; Mac Ginty 
2015; Narten 2008; Nathan 2007). It is vital for the effectiveness, sustainability, and legitimacy of 
SSR missions (Edmunds, Juncos & Algar-Faria 2018; UNSC 2020a). 
The concept of local ownership has its roots in the development circles that emphasized the 
importance of ‘empowering local communities and encouraging local participation’ in peacebuild-
ing and democracy promotion (Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012: 150). ‘The language of 
ownership’ was first used in OECD-DAC’s Development Partnerships in the New Global Context 
document in May 1995 (Chesterman 2007: 7). The OECD endorsed the significance of promoting 
the local ownership in SSR missions back in 2001 (Dursun-Özkanca 2018). Then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan referred to the concept in his report on exit strategies in UN peacekeeping 
missions the same year (UNSG 2001). Since then, the inclusion of local stakeholders, including 
government institutions, civil society organizations, and the wider public and local communities 
in the SSR processes emerged as a vital aspect in the evaluation of the success of SSR missions 
(Baker 2010; Ball 2010; Caparini 2010; Donais 2008; Dursun-Özkanca 2018; Dursun-Özkanca 
& Crossley-Frolick 2012; Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012; Nathan 2007; Simons 2012; 
Tholens 2012; Vandemoortele 2012). It is important for the missions to have people’s support, 
inclusivity, representativeness, and legitimacy to ensure sustainability, local ownership, and suc-
cessful SSR implementation (Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 2012; Hansen 2008; Law 2006; 
Nathan 2007; Schnabel 2012). Such missions should aim for ‘transformative participation’ rather 
than ‘functional participation in order to gain ‘buy-in,’ minimise dissent (i.e., ‘winning hearts and 
minds’) and apply a veneer of local ownership’ (Kunz & Valasek 2012: 131).
With regard to the implementation of the local ownership principle, SSR missions have mixed 
track records (Brzoska 2006). There is a gap in the literature on sources of local legitimacy in 
peacebuilding (Paris 2010), and on the lessons learned about local ownership (Dursun-Özkanca, 
2014, 2018). Concepts of sustainability, proper implementation of reforms developed by outsiders, 
and the link between SSG/R and broader rule of law reforms are important dimensions of SSR as 
well as SDG-16. 
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Occasionally, sustainability and democratization as well as efficiency and efficacy of mission 
goals may clash in SSR missions (Dursun-Özkanca 2018). With regard to the efficiency of SSR 
missions, for instance, as it takes time and significant resources to engage in consultations with 
broad segments of the society, overlooking the local consultation process may prolong the dura-
tion of a mission and the presence of external actors (Blease & Qehaja 2014; Cubitt 2013; Dursun-
Özkanca 2018; Gordon 2014; Narten 2008; Nathan 2007). A number of scholars draw attention to 
the fact that peacebuilding missions often fail to acknowledge the local political context and are 
generally conducted by excluding the non-elite members of local communities (Dursun-Özkanca 
2018; Gordon 2014; Mac Ginty 2008; Papagianni 2009; Peake, Scheye & Hills 2006; Pugh, Cooper 
& Turner 2008). They warn that focusing solely on the local elites ‘can undermine the extent to 
which SSR processes are broadly locally owned’ by the local communities (Gordon 2014: 129). On 
that front, the inclusion of women and girls ‘in institutional arrangements to guarantee their pro-
tection and full participation in peace processes’ emerge as an important actionable item (UNSC 
2020a: 3). The South African Presidency of the UNSC recently reiterated that the international 
community should focus on viable, sustainable SSG/R, called for ‘bridging the gap between policy 
and practical implementation issues’ on SSR, and advised the international community to use 
‘whole-of-mission strategies’ that integrate national development plans and SSR (UNSC 2020a: 
4–5). In Resolution 2553, which was recently adopted by the UNSC on SSR, the UN highlighted 
the ‘centrality of national ownership,’ ‘informed by the needs and aspirations of the entire popula-
tion’ for SSR processes (UNSC 2020b: 4).
Therefore, in order to ensure long-lasting peace, the local community’s demands should be lis-
tened to and met (Chandler 2006). For instance, a key source of success behind the post-apartheid 
transformation of the defense sector of South Africa was its locally led and locally driven nature 
(DCAF 2021). Similarly, Community Safety Partnerships in Nigeria as well as the high level of 
local ownership in Senegal are successful implementations of the local ownership principle con-
tributing to the success of SSR in these countries (DCAF 2021). 
Accordingly, many believe that bottom-up approaches are more effective than top-down 
approaches to SSR because they emphasize the importance of the mission’s sensitivity to the 
local context and the involvement of the local community in the reform process (Moore 2014). 
Others call for the application of indigenous practices in peacebuilding based on consensus deci-
sion making and compensation to ensure ‘a grass-roots legitimacy’ (Mac Ginty 2008: 155). Some 
warn, ‘despite intentions to the contrary, donor-initiated SSR programmes tend to be primarily 
donor-driven, often with little input from beneficiaries at planning and implementation phases’ 
(Schnabel 2012: 64). Martin (2012: 15) notes that the international community often sees local 
ownership ‘as an impediment – an example of persistent misunderstanding, and often mistrust, 
between different groups.’ However, SSR processes that do not take into consideration the local 
needs and demands and exclusively rely on the interest of external actors or domestic elites will 
have little resonance with the people at the community-level (Cubitt 2013; De Coning 2013; 
Hansen 2008; Martin 2012; Scheye 2008a, 2008b). 
Therefore, ‘the international community risks appearing hypocritical in emphasizing local own-
ership, when it is widely acknowledged that the involvement of local actors is significantly con-
strained’ (Martin et al. 2012: 4). A good response to such criticisms of hypocrisy could be through 
ensuring ‘local engagement’ and participative approach, which could be more easily accomplished 
in countries ‘where institutions are settled, [and] divisions of responsibility and chains of com-
mand are clear’ (Edmunds, Juncos & Algar-Faria 2018: 234). Donors should relinquish ‘a degree of 
control … in order to create the space and time for programmes to develop in their own dynamic 
and sometimes rather messy way’ in order to ‘give meaning to the aspirations for local empower-
ment’ (Edmunds, Juncos & Algar-Faria 2018: 236).
Additionally, the SSR mission timeframes as well as the means and resources through 
which ownership is practiced emerge as important themes in discussions of local ownership 
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(Dursun-Özkanca 2018; Hansen 2008). In post-conflict peacebuilding missions, an important 
question emerges: When is the right time for the international community to withdraw from the 
field in a way to transfer power and responsibility to the local authorities? When the international 
community is predominantly concerned with efficiency in delivering the desired outcomes, local 
ownership may not be an attainable goal, given the time pressures that the missions operate under. 
In a similar vein, SSR ‘processes are long-term endeavours that marry short-term crisis manage-
ment tasks with the long-term development of institutions, capacity and culture’ (Hansen 2008: 39). 
Therefore, a participative approach ‘will have to be promoted across the entire spectrum of SSR 
activities to varying degrees and at varying stages’ (Hansen 2008: 39). Time pressure may emerge 
as ‘an excuse for bypassing local partners,’ and concerns about security may ‘override’ the desires 
towards local ownership (Hansen 2008: 40). Under such circumstances, even though the interna-
tional community retains some formal powers, ‘its actual powers will be increasingly contested at 
the local level and will eventually wither away’ (Peter 2013: 425). 
For a successful implementation of SSR, an emphasis on SSG and ‘a principled acceptance of 
democratic politics by the government, civil servants and security actors’ are necessary (Wulf 
2004: 9). The ‘legacy of fragmentation, distrust and tension’ in a post-conflict society ‘makes it 
difficult to develop a rule-of-law culture and reach a local consensus on the form, purpose and 
priorities of the security architecture,’ making the implementation of local ownership challeng-
ing (Dursun-Özkanca 2018; Hansen 2008: 41). Moreover, during democratization and in post- 
conflict and fragile states, justice and security are ‘scarce commodities’ (Scheye 2008b: 63), ‘not 
only in terms of how they are provided but also to whom they are delivered and what objectives 
they are intended to achieve’ (Wulf 2011: 349). ‘Given that donor programming will inevitably 
create winners and losers, the important political question is local ownership by whom and for 
whom?’ (Scheye 2008b: 63).
The concept of the social contract ascends in significance in countries affected by conflict, fra-
gility, and fraught transition (McCandless 2020). As the UK DFID states in its Building Peaceful 
States and Societies and other documents, in order ‘to rearticulate the linkages between state and 
society, strengthen the social contract, and foster legitimacy,’ ‘political settlements and political 
processes [should become] more inclusive by including not only the relevant actors to the violent 
conflict, but also incorporating other groups that have traditionally been excluded or marginalized’ 
(Quoted in Rocha Menocal 2015: 7). When institutions are under the control of a narrow elite and 
display deeply personalized relationships, they are more prone to violent conflict than the ones 
that are more institutionalized and operate under the rule of law (North et al. 2009). ‘Open access 
orders’ allow for equality and inclusion, and channel opposition through the use of political pro-
cesses that are available to the citizens (North et al. 2009: 2). The role of ‘horizontal inequalities,’ 
or exclusions based on group identity, cause state fragility and conflict, as they persist over time 
(Stewart 2008). The local ownership principle’s application will determine whether ‘populations 
[will] regard security services as being for them as opposed to being imposed from above or 
outside’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 12). Context specificity and local ownership have also been 
acknowledged by SDG-17 and its Target 17.15 - ‘Respect each country’s policy space and leader-
ship to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development.’
Accordingly, the local factors and the country-specific conditions have significant implications 
on the implementation of the local ownership principle in SSR (Dursun-Özkanca 2014). Local 
ownership, inclusivity, and representativeness of SSR missions are very much in line with the 
human security approach, which also emphasizes people-centered, context-specific, inclusive, and 
bottom-up engagement in complex problems. From the human security perspective, it is impor-
tant to include the marginalized portions of the society in the SSR processes of decision making 
and implementation. Multi-stakeholder engagement is something that is also acknowledged by 
Agenda 2030. The goal behind stakeholder engagement in Agenda 2030 is to ensure responsive, 
inclusive, participatory, and representative decision making at all levels of society. Emphasizing 
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the ‘leaving no one behind’ principle, human security and SDG-16 ensures that ‘those at risk of 
being overlooked have a voice in government decisions that affect them’ (The Global Alliance 
2019: 65). Furthermore, ‘people-centered service delivery is critical to all the SDGs: from access-
ing education and health, to reducing inequality, to ensuring security, justice and the rule of law’ 
(The Global Alliance 2019: 65). 
Even though there is ‘a growing awareness of the importance of incorporating local-level actors 
into peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, international actors have struggled to engage 
simultaneously both national-level actors and local communities’ (Burt 2016: 2). As Burt (2016: 2) 
notes, ‘SSR’s contribution to SDG-16 and its targets will depend on the ability of programs to 
bridge the gaps’ between the local, national, and international levels. SSR should, therefore, engage 
beyond the international-national level in order to contribute to state-society relations, ‘which are 
at the core of peace and development, particularly in the fragile and conflict-affected states receiv-
ing SSR support’ (Burt 2016: 2). On the topic, warning about the prospects of having an ‘inclusive 
but not very participatory’ multi-stakeholder consultations, the Global Alliance (2019: 66) notes: 
Although [formal consultative processes] may guarantee a few seats at the table to civil 
society representatives, often those participants are not very critical of the government. 
Moreover, such consultations often fail to incorporate civil society recommendations into 
policy efforts. It remains a challenge to ensure the participation of marginalized groups, 
especially when these embody overlapping marginalized attributes, such as women in 
indigenous populations.
Much lip service has been paid to incorporating views of the consumers and ultimate benefi-
ciaries of justice and security services, that is, the local people, in SSR missions. Nevertheless, 
‘SSR assessments rarely take the time for local-level consultations,’ due to the perception that it is 
‘a time-consuming, complex and costly activity’ (Kunz & Valasek 2012: 131). If SSR turns ‘its back 
on the lessons learnt regarding participatory development practices,’ it is ‘doomed to be a top-
down, externally imposed process that fails to acknowledge the agency and authority of people 
who experience (in)security’ (Kunz & Valasek 2012: 131). In assessing the success of SSR mis-
sions, it is important ‘to take into account existing power dynamics and ensure that the voices of 
marginalised groups are heard’ (Kunz & Valasek 2012: 137).
Therefore, human security’s inclusivity, multidimensional and comprehensive approach, and 
its mantra of ‘leaving no one behind’ would be a good solution for the deficiencies identified in 
SSR missions in terms of the lack of local ownership and participative approaches. As a means to 
empower local people, ‘SSR processes should move away from state-centrism to work with the 
full range of local-level security and justice providers, including women’s organisations and cus-
tomary authorities,’ and incorporate ‘formal and informal mechanisms for local-level collabora-
tion between representatives of SSIs, customary authorities, community leaders and civil society 
groups’ (Kunz & Valasek 2012: 137). As the Pathways for Peace document cautions, ‘growth and 
poverty alleviation … alone will not suffice to sustain peace’ (UN & WB 2018: xviii), and there is 
a need for ‘inclusive solutions through dialogue,’ ‘macroeconomic policies, institutional reform in 
core state functions, and redistributive policies’ (UN & WB 2018: xix). In line with the compre-
hensive and multidimensional approach of human security, SSR needs ‘to focus on more than just 
rule of law, and should include multi-sectoral approaches,’ such as ‘urban planning perspectives in 
terms of designing spaces that are perceived as functionally safe’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 12). 
Therefore, participative and bottom-up approach and protection and empowerment principles of 
human security along with a renewed emphasis on local ownership provided by the SSR literature 
acquire a vital role in ensuring that SDG-16 targets are met.
Conclusion
Besides being goals in their own right, peace and good governance are ‘also catalysts for achieving 
many other targets,’ making SDG-16 central for the implementation of the overall 2030 Agenda 
(SDG-16 Conference 2019: 2). Security and development are inextricably interconnected. No sin-
gle actor, state or non-state, can tackle the complex development- and security-related challenges 
on its own. Civil wars and instability ‘are often grounded in inequality, injustice and mismanage-
ment of natural resources’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 2). Compartmentalization serves neither 
the goal of achieving SDG-16 nor any other SDGs. Therefore, there is a need for a well-oiled 
cooperation machine at the international, national, and local levels. 
SSG/R are critical for reforming the judicial and security sectors, the intelligence services, police 
force, correctional systems, and the military (Dursun-Özkanca & Crossley-Frolick 2012). In post-
conflict settings, ‘Stabilization and reconstruction are inextricably linked to security, governance, 
law and order,’ making it ‘vital that the new security infrastructures are carefully constructed, with 
special attention devoted to vetting, inter-ethnic balance in recruitment, and democratic oversight 
of the new security institutions’ (Dursun-Özkanca & Crossley-Frolick 2012: 15). Building capac-
ity in these sectors ensures the safety of the whole population (Meharg, Arnusch, & Cook Merrill 
2010). Moreover, building democratically accountable and professional security forces is not only 
a critical component of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies but also a key endeavor of 
SSG/R elsewhere (Dursun-Özkanca 2017; Dursun-Özkanca & Crossley-Frolick 2012). A holistic 
approach would significantly benefit SSR implementation (Dursun-Özkanca & Vandemoortele 
2012), and human security would effectively contribute to it by using its comparative advantages of 
the comprehensive and multidimensional approach. 
Human security lies at the heart of the nexus between UN’s Agenda 2030 and SSG/R and is 
important for creating a synergy between security and development in achieving common goals 
shared by SDG-16 and SSG/R. Cooperation and a holistic approach are necessary in order to tackle 
the increasingly complex problems that the global community faces, as illustrated by the ongoing 
pandemic. Since COVID-19 is a global problem that menaces all of humanity, global coopera-
tion and ‘global solutions’ emerge as crucial elements of effective response to complex problems 
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intensified by the pandemic (UN 2020c: 11). Effective multilateralism has to be in place in order 
to successfully meet the SDG targets. Against this background, ‘a whole-of-society approach’ is 
needed with ‘multidimensional, coordinated, swift and decisive’ response (UN 2020c: 13). Human 
security ensures that a multi-stakeholder/comprehensive approach is in place. 
This manuscript makes a case that while there are many commonalities between human secu-
rity, SSG/R, and SDG-16, having a human security approach would ensure that these common-
alities are weaved more tightly between SSG/R and SDG-16. SSG/R can help achieve SDG-16 by 
incorporating the guidelines provided by a broader understanding of human security that empha-
sizes both negative and positive peace. It further concludes human security’s emphasis on reform-
ing security and justice sectors and on accountability, oversight, and participative approach and 
local ownership can facilitate the accomplishment of SDG-16’s primary objective of establishing 
peace, justice, and strong and inclusive institutions. Human security’s ‘leave no one behind’ man-
tra would contribute to the institutional reform of the security and justice sectors by SSR. 
This manuscript maintains that there is a need to link SSG/R with human security more closely, 
which in turn would ensure the fulfillment of SDG-16 targets more efficiently and effectively. Here 
it is important to remember that more often than not freedom from fear ‘has its roots in freedom 
from want,’ and ‘addressing fragility, violence, and conflict is the only way for societies to develop’ 
(Born 2018). Therefore, ‘SSR efforts must take account of economic issues, particularly the lack of 
employment opportunities for demobilised young men and women’ (Born 2018). In this context, 
combatting corruption should also be a top priority, as it has ‘a catalytic effect on violence, and 
the perceptions of populations towards institutions at all levels can easily feed feelings of margin-
alization and exclusion’ (SDG-16 Conference 2019: 12). Therefore, transparency, anti-corruption 
campaigns, and national human rights councils emerge as important efforts in SSR-SDG-16 
linkage (SDG-16 Conference 2019).
Inclusivity is important for a successful implementation of SDG-16. Human security empha-
sizes inclusivity and the avoidance of exacerbation of inequalities. People-centered, context- 
specific, and nationally owned SSR can be made possible through the implementation of 
the human security approach. Furthermore, prevention-oriented SSR necessitates ‘increasing the 
accountability, inclusiveness and resilience of the security sector within an institution-building 
framework’ (Guerber 2018). Here, once again, SSR would benefit from integrating the inclusivity 
as well as the prevention-oriented approach of human security. 
If there is one major observation that can be derived from the Black Lives Matter protests in the 
US and elsewhere in 2020, SSR and SDG-16 are not only developing world or Global South issues, 
but also Global North issues as well. The events following the murder of George Floyd while under 
police custody in Minneapolis emphasize the need to address SSR-SDG-16 linkages at a global 
level, rather than only at developing or post-conflict country levels. The inclusion of different 
voices, protection of the most vulnerable and marginalized people, a participative approach, equal 
access to justice, tackling corruption, and oversight and accountability are central to establishing 
tighter SSG/R-SDG-16 linkages. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is not only a public health crisis but also is directly related to socio-
economic development and poses challenges to peace, justice, international institutions, and 
global cooperation. This is a time of converging global crises, economic, health, racial, and sys-
temic inequalities. The pandemic threatens the future capacity to meet the SDGs in general, 
and the targets of SDG-16 in particular. For instance, it could potentially ‘reverse gains in gen-
der equality and poverty alleviation in many countries’ (Azcona et al. 2020: 1). Domestic and 
gender-based violence incidents have increased during the pandemic (Bettinger-Lopez & Bro 
2020), hence, acquiring a better understanding of ‘the gendered impact of this humanitarian 
crisis’ is vital to ‘guarantee the protection of all members of the affected population’ (UN Women 
2020: 7). 
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The global economy is shrinking due to COVID-19. The economic consequences of COVID-19 
significantly increased governments’ expenses around the world, ‘plunging tax bases and a 
collapse of foreign exchange flows affecting, in particular, tourism-dependent countries and com-
modity exporters,’ ‘threatening the ability of many developing countries to service their external 
debts,’ posing ‘large risks for the attainment of the 2030 Agenda’ (UN 2020b). While many coun-
tries around the world issued economic stimulus packages to minimize the negative impact of the 
crisis on their general population, the most fragile and the poorest countries in the Global South 
were unable to respond to the pandemic in an effective manner. The pandemic brought under the 
spotlight the unsustainable inequalities both within and between nations.
The implementation of the SDGs in general and SDG-16 in particular face additional hurdles 
due to the fact that financing of development will be acutely difficult. Conflict-affected and frag-
ile countries, such as the G7+ countries, are struggling in responding to the pandemic. Lock-
downs and closure of borders had the worst impact on conflict-ridden countries. Livelihood and 
well-being of immigrants and refugees are in danger. The crisis has the potential to reverse the 
gains made over the last couple of years towards accomplishing SDG-16 (#SDG16Plus 2020). 
International cooperation, multilateralism, and solidarity become more important in this context. 
G7+ issued a joint statement on the pandemic, calling for an immediate ceasefire to fight the virus, 
support for institutional learning at the peer-level (#SDG16Plus 2020).
The pandemic also brought to the forefront the systemic racism and violation of civil rights 
in many countries around the world. To illustrate, the pandemic was used as an excuse by some 
governments to curb freedoms of expression and other civil rights. This further highlights the 
importance of acquiring the human security approach and strengthening checks and balances 
in a way to give voice to all people. Good governance and strong institutions are also key in the 
context of the COVID-19 response and recovery with direct implications for the ability to advance 
the health and the well-being of citizens. 
The pandemic is a complex problem requiring a comprehensive multilateral approach through 
global cooperation and global governance. SDG-16 is frequently viewed as a way to operational-
ize the global partnership aspect of SDG-17. International cooperation becomes more important 
in the post-COVID-19 world (Bernes et al. 2020). Multilateralism and solidarity can be a solution 
for inclusivity and interconnected problems (Khasanova 2020; Leal Filho et al. 2020; UN 2020c). 
In order to build resilience against global retrenchment, the countries around the world should 
create accountable, ethical, inclusive institutions at international, national, and local levels to 
ensure public trust. SDG-16’s focus on transparency, accountability, and inclusivity calls for trust 
between the public and the government. This is necessary to address systemic issues. Participa-
tion and engagement of civil society is key to ensure effective and equitable response and provide 
oversight of governance response. 
Partnerships between ‘diverse actors’ and diverse backgrounds ‘from peace and security, 
to human rights to development’ would also serve SSR well (Guerber 2018). It is also important to 
‘strengthen the comprehensive, integrated, and coherent approach’ of the UN in SSR and improve 
its ‘strategic partnerships’ with ‘regional and subregional arrangements and organizations,’ such 
as the African Union in order to ‘foster strategic coherence of efforts’ (UNSC 2020b: 7–8). There-
fore, the multi-stakeholder and comprehensive approach of human security would help SSR to 
accomplish different targets of SDG-16. We should put human security, SSG/R, and SDG-16 at 
the heart of the COVID-19 response and recovery, in order to ensure that the pandemic response 
does not divert the world’s attention away from founding peaceful societies, establishing justice, 
and providing transparency so that public trust and inclusive policies are part of recovery plan-
ning and implementation.
Finally, while timelines are good for pressuring member states to accomplish the goals by a cer-
tain deadline, they may also lead to certain tasks not being fulfilled completely, causing them to 
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focus on short-term gains that are easily assessable rather than longer-term goals that are harder 
to achieve and assess. In that sense, the SDG timeline of 2030 may lead stakeholders to focus on 
making progress on negative peace targets rather than on positive peace targets, as the former 
are easier to assess and accomplish when compared to the latter. To illustrate, tracking progress 
on negative peace items such as Target 16.1 on violence reduction is easier and more straight-
forward, when compared to assessing positive peace items such as Target 16.6 on transparency 
and accountability or Target 16.7 on inclusiveness in participation, essential good governance 
principles. Since international institutions are interested in proving their success through assess-
able goals, they may be inclined to lower the bar for expectations for peace, justice, and strong 
institutions to save face. 
All in all, a concurrent emphasis on security and development is needed for addressing the 
issues under the purview of SDG-16. The political will to stay on course and fully achieve both 
negative and positive peace targets as well as long-term funding emerge as important factors, as 
do coordination and cooperation between different stakeholders. As demonstrated in this mansu-
cript, SSG/R and human security have a promising potential to ensure that the SDGs, particularly 
SDG-16, will not face the fate of the MDGs.
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 is Security Sector Reform (SSR) Paper o ers a universal and analytical perspective 
on the linkages between Security Sector Governance (SSG)/SSR (SSG/R) and Sus-
tainable Development Goal-16 (SDG-16), focusing on con ict and post-con ict set-
tings as well as transitional and consolidated democracies. Against the background 
of development and security literatures traditionally maintaining separate and com-
partmentalized presence in both academic and policymaking circles, it maintains 
that the contemporary security- and development-related challenges are inextricably 
linked, requiring e ective measures with an accurate understanding of the nature of 
these challenges. In that sense, SDG-16 is surely a good step in the right direction. 
A er comparing and contrasting SSG/R and SDG-16, this SSR Paper argues that 
human security lies at the heart of the nexus between the 2030 Agenda of the United 
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to address by comparing and contrasting SSG/R with SDG-16. A er making a case 
that human security lies at the heart of the nexus between the UN’s 2030 Agenda
and SSG/R, this book analyses the strengths and weaknesses of human security as 
a bridge between SSG/R and SDG-16 and makes policy recommendations on how 
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